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ABSTRACT
This dissertation examines robust optimal macroeconomic policy under ambiguity in a
general discrete-time linear-quadratic framework. This dissertation is composed of three
independent but closely-related essays. The first essay studies robust Ramsey policy prob-
lems when the Ramsey planner faces three types of ambiguity. This framework includes
both exogenous and endogenous state variables. In addition, the equilibrium system from
the private sector contains both backward-looking and forward-looking dynamics. This
chapter provides recursive characterizations and algorithms to solve for robust policy and
then apply it to a basic New Keynesian model of optimal monetary policy with persistent
cost-push shocks. The main findings are: (i) all three types of ambiguity make optimal
monetary policy more history-dependent but with different reasons for each type; and (ii)
they deliver qualitatively different initial responses of inflation and the output gap following
a cost-push shock.
The second essay extends Woodford’s (2010) approach to the robustly optimal monetary
policy. This paper provides algorithms to solve for a time-invariant linear robustly optimal
policy in a timeless perspective and for a time-invariant linear Markov perfect equilibrium
under discretion. The main findings include: i) the robustly optimal commitment inflation
is less responsive to a cost-push shock when the shock is more persistent; ii) the robustly
optimal discretionary policy is more responsive to lagged inflation when inflation is more
persistent.
The third essay documents the impact of belief ambiguity by changing the relative
iv
degree of concern for ambiguity associated with two different shocks: cost-push shocks and
the natural rate of interest shocks. The main results are: i) belief ambiguity relating to
cost-push shocks matters to a central bank much more than belief ambiguity associated with
the natural rate of interest shocks; ii) in some cases, after a positive cost-push shock robust
optimal monetary policy allows initial inflation higher than under rational expectations; iii)
robust optimal monetary policy is not symmetrical in terms of its response to different signs
of a shock.
v
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
The rational expectations hypothesis founded by Muth (1961) has been a workhorse in
dynamic modeling for policy problems such as optimally choosing monetary and fiscal policy.
Under this hypothesis, a policymaker and the private sector share common beliefs about
the state of the world and these beliefs coincide with the objective probability model of
the state of the world. The rational expectations hypothesis has benefited economists and
policymakers by not only providing sharp predictions but also achieving simplicity through
imposing internal coherence of models. While we have learned many lessons from this
framework, there are several good reasons for us to think about departures from it. First,
the Ellsberg (1961) paradox and related experimental evidence demonstrate that there is a
distinction between risk and ambiguity. Risk refers to the situation where there is a known
probability distribution over the state of the world, while ambiguity refers to the situation
where the information is too vague to be adequately summarized by a single probability
distribution. As a result, a decision maker may have multiple priors in mind (Gilboa and
Schmeidler (1989)).
Second, considering the possibility of model misspecification, rational expectations be-
come a particularly strong assumption since it is extremely difficult to achieve a coincidence
of beliefs among diverse agents with different levels of knowledge about the true models.
As Anderson, Hansen and Sargent (2003) and Hansen and Sargent (2001, 2008, and 2010)
point out, economic agents view economic models as an approximation to the true model.
They believe that economic data come from an unknown member of a set of unspecified
models near the approximating model. As a result, concern about model misspecification
induces economic agents to become averse to model ambiguity and want to seek robust
2decision rules that work over that set of nearby models.
As Lucas (1976), Sargent and Wallace (1975), and many others show, the implications of
the rational expectations hypothesis are profound for the model design and macroeconomic
policymaking. The goal of the this dissertation is to study how those implications would
be modified when explicitly acknowledging decision-makers’ fear of ambiguity. Typically, in
optimal policy problems there are two types of agents, the policymaker (or the Stackelberg
leader) and the private sector (or the follower). Given the constraints derived from the
optimization conditions of the private sector, the policymaker chooses optimal policy. Then
the private sector takes policy decisions as given. When introducing ambiguity aversion to
this framework, one has to consider who faces ambiguity and what the agent is ambiguous
about. In this dissertation, I assume that only the policymaker faces ambiguity1, following
Hansen and Sargent (2008, 2012) and Woodford (2010). In this way I can focus on the
implications of ambiguity in the perspective of the policymaker.
To formulate the policymaker’s fear of ambiguity, I apply robust control theory following
a series of works by Hansen and Sargent. In robust control theory the concern for model
misspecification is formalized in a two-player zero-sum game with the minimax theory and a
conservative-case analysis. By the service of the minimizing player in a two-player zero-sum
game the conditional distribution of exogenous shocks can be misspecified. Hansen and
Sargent (2008, 2010) explain robust control can formulate model ambiguity in the spirit of
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). In this dissertation, I feature linear-quadratic robust control
and provide useful solution algorithms.
This dissertation is composed of three independent but closely related papers. From
chapter 2 to chapter 4, each chapter corresponds to a paper. Chapter 2 studies robust
Ramsey policy problems when the Ramsey planner faces three types of ambiguity. This
framework includes both exogenous and endogenous state variables. In addition, the equi-
librium system from the private sector contains both backward-looking and forward-looking
dynamics. This chapter provides recursive characterizations and algorithms to solve for ro-
1See Benigno and Paciello (2011) and Karantounias (2013) for the modeling of the case where the private
agents face ambiguity but the policymaker does not.
3bust policy and then apply it to a basic New Keynesian model of optimal monetary policy
with persistent cost-push shocks. The main findings are: (i) all three types of ambiguity
make optimal monetary policy more history-dependent but with different reasons for each
type; and (ii) they deliver qualitatively different initial responses of inflation and the output
gap following a cost-push shock.
Chapter 3 extends Woodford’s (2010) approach to the robustly optimal monetary policy.
This chapter provides algorithms to solve for a time-invariant linear robustly optimal policy
in a timeless perspective and for a time-invariant linear Markov perfect equilibrium under
discretion. The main findings include: i) the robustly optimal commitment inflation is less
responsive to a cost-push shock when the shock is more persistent; ii) the robustly optimal
discretionary policy is more responsive to lagged inflation when inflation is more persistent.
Chapter 4 documents the impact of belief ambiguity by changing the relative degree
of concern for ambiguity associated with two different shocks: cost-push shocks and the
natural rate of interest shocks. The main results are: i) belief ambiguity relating to cost-
push shocks matters to a central bank much more than belief ambiguity associated with
the natural rate of interest shocks; ii) in some cases, after a positive cost-push shock robust
optimal monetary policy allows initial inflation higher than under rational expectations; iii)
robust optimal monetary policy is not symmetrical in terms of its response to different signs
of a shock.
Finally chapter 5 concludes with a discussion of future applications and extensions to
the work here.
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5Chapter 2
Three Types of A Robust Ramsey Problem in a
Linear-Quadratic Framework (with Jianjun Miao)
Abstract
This essay studies robust Ramsey policy problems in a general discrete-time linear- quadratic
framework when the Ramsey planner faces three types of ambiguity. This framework in-
cludes both exogenous and endogenous state variables. In addition, the equilibrium system
from the private sector contains both backward-looking and forward-looking dynamics. We
provide recursive characterizations and algorithms to solve for robust policy. We apply
our method to a basic New Keynesian model of optimal monetary policy with persistent
cost-push shocks. We find that (i) all three types of ambiguity make optimal monetary
policy more history-dependent but with different reasons for each type; and (ii) they deliver
qualitatively different initial responses of inflation and the output gap following a cost-push
shock.
2.1 Introduction
The standard framework of Ramsey policy problems typically adopts the rational expec-
tations hypothesis. Under this hypothesis, a Ramsey planner (or the Stackelberg leader)
and a private sector (or the follower) share common beliefs about the state of the world
and these beliefs coincide with the objective probability model of the state of the world.
The rational expectations hypothesis has benefited economists and policymakers by not
only providing sharp predictions but also achieving simplicity through imposing internal
6coherence of models. Considering the possibility of model misspecification, however, ra-
tional expectations become a particularly strong assumption since it is extremely difficult
to achieve a coincidence of beliefs among diverse agents with different levels of knowledge
about the true models. Following Hansen and Sargent (2001, 2008) and Anderson, Hansen,
and Sargent (2003), one can view economic models as an approximation to the real world.
Economic agents do not know the true models and their models may be misspecified. They
are averse to model ambiguity and want to seek decision making that is robust to model
misspecifications.1
The goal of our paper is to study how the Ramsey planner designs a robust policy in
the presence of model ambiguity. In a Ramsey problem, there are two types of agents,
the Ramsey planner and the private sector. One has to consider who faces ambiguity and
what the agents are ambiguous about. In this paper, we follow Hansen and Sargent (2012)
and consider three types of ambiguity. For all these types, only the Ramsey planner faces
ambiguity.2 Type I ambiguity refers to the case where the Ramsey planner has a concern for
robustness about both the exogenous shock processes and expectations of the private sector.
The planner chooses a robust policy based on the same distorted beliefs used by itself and the
private sector. For type II ambiguity, the Ramsey planner does not trust its approximating
model of the exogenous shock processes, but the private agents trust this approximating
model. Finally, for type III ambiguity originally suggested by Woodford (2010), the planner
fully trusts its approximating model of the exogenous shock processes. But it does not have
full confidence about the private agents’ beliefs. An important implication of these three
types of ambiguity is that types II and III generate endogenous belief heterogeneity, while
type I does not.
To solve the three types of the robust Ramsey problem corresponding to the three types
of ambiguity, we adopt a recursive formulation using the recursive saddle point method
1The Hansen and Sargent approach is related to decision theory on ambiguity. Maccheroni, Marinacci, and
Rustichini (2006a,b) and Strzalecki (2011) have provided axiomatic foundations. See Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1989) for an alternative approach based on the maxmin expected utility model.
2See Karantounias (2013) for the modeling of the case where the private agents face ambiguity but the
policymaker does not.
7of Marcet and Marimon (2011). The key idea is to incorporate the Lagrange multiplier
associated with the forward-looking constraints as a state variable. For the robust Ramsey
problem, we also incorporate the planner’s belief distortion (formally, the Radon-Nikodym
derivative) as a state variable. For type I robust Ramsey problem, we show that the value
function has a homogeneity property so that we can reduce the dimension of the state space.
By suitably transforming the problem, we characterize the robust policy using the standard
linear-quadratic method. In particular, we prove that the robust policy is a linear function of
the predetermined state variable and the Lagrange multiplier, like in the standard Ramsey
problem with rational expectations.
For types II and III robust Ramsey problem, we can also reduce the dimension of the
state space by defining a belief-adjusted Lagrange multiplier as a state variable. However, we
cannot transform types II and III robust Ramsey problem into a standard linear-quadratic
form. In particular, the robust policy does not have a linear solution. We have to use
a nonlinear solution method. We apply the second-order approximation around the non-
stochastic steady state to derive numerical solutions. We implement this method using the
Dynare software.3
We apply our methods to a basic New Keynesian model of optimal monetary policy
with persistent cost-push shocks. We solve for robustly optimal monetary policies under
three types of ambiguity and compare these policies with the standard optimal policy under
rational expectations. In order to make comparisons of the three types of robust policy,
we have to calibrate the robustness parameter consistently in the three types of robust
Ramsey problem. We use the same detection error probability for discriminating between
the approximating model and the endogenous worst-case model associated with a particular
robustness parameter in each of the three types of robust Ramsey problem to calibrate this
parameter.
Following Hansen and Sargent (2008), we compute the detection error probability using
likelihood ratio tests. Since type I robust Ramsey problem yields a linear solution, we can
3See Adjemian et al. (2011).
8use the Kalman filter to obtain the likelihood function. For types II and III robust Ramsey
problem, however, we cannot use the Kalman filter since solutions are in a nonlinear form.
Instead, we use particle filtering to compute the likelihood.
We find that all three types of ambiguity make the robustly optimal monetary policy
more history-dependent than in the case of rational expectations, in line with Woodford
(2010), Hansen and Sargent (2012), and Kwon and Miao (2012). Woodford (2000) points out
that optimal commitment monetary policy under rational expectations is history-dependent.
That is, it not only depends on the current state of the economy but also responds to past
states. The intuition is that a history-dependent policy can affect the expectation of private
agents and thus improves the performance of monetary policy. Why does optimal monetary
policy under ambiguity become more history-dependent? Economic intuitions behind this
feature are not the same across the three types of robust Ramsey problem. In type I robust
Ramsey problem, increased history-dependence comes from the fact that the central bank
(henceforth, CB) is concerned about the distortion of the cost-push shock. In types II
and III robust Ramsey problem, the CB’s incentive to better manage the expectations of
the private sector is a major source of more history-dependent monetary policy. Under the
worst-case beliefs, the CB and the private sector have disparate expectations so that the CB
becomes more cautious to affect appropriately the private sector’s expectations. Reflecting
the CB’s caution, the robustly optimal monetary policy becomes more history-dependent.
Even though three types of ambiguity share the property that inflation dynamics be-
come more history-dependent, their implications for prices are different. Under the rational
expectations hypothesis, optimal monetary policy implies the CB undoes all the effect of a
cost-push shock and thus prices go back to the original level. However, this no longer applies
to types II and III robust Ramsey problem. We find that the CB adjusts inflation more
than under rational expectations and hence prices go below the original level in the long
run. In these two types of robust Ramsey problem, the fact that the CB and the private
sector have heterogeneous beliefs makes the dynamics of the price level deviate from that
under rational expectations. By contrast, in type I robust Ramsey problem, both the CB
9and the private section share the same distorted beliefs about the cost-push shock, causing
prices to go back to the original level in the long run.
We also show that the initial responses of inflation and output gap to a positive cost-push
shock are disparate for different types of ambiguity. In type I robust Ramsey problem, the
CB increases the initial responses of both inflation and output. Under the worst-case beliefs,
the CB worries that the cost-push shock is distorted in mean so that the CB responds as if
the shock were greater compared to a shock in the approximating model. In type II robust
Ramsey problem, while the CB increases the initial response of inflation, it decreases the
initial response of output. The CB worries about the unfavorable distortion in the cost-
push shock, which leads to an increase in the inflation response. On the other hand, the CB
exploits the fact that the private sector fully trusts its approximating model. The cost-push
shock in this model is believed less persistent than in the worst-case distorted model. As
a result, the CB faces a smaller tradeoff between inflation and output. In type III robust
Ramsey problem, the CB’s initial response of inflation to a cost-push shock is less sensitive
but the output responds more sensitively. The concern for robustness of the expectations of
the private sector makes the CB manage the inflation expectations more cautiously. Thus,
the CB faces a larger tradeoff. This result is in line with Woodford (2010) and Kwon and
Miao (2012), even though they study type III ambiguity in the timeless perspective instead
of the Ramsey framework.
Our paper is closely related to Hansen and Sargent (2012). Hansen and Sargent study
three types of ambiguity in a continuous-time basic New Keynesian model of monetary
policy. One of our contributions is to extend their idea of three types of ambiguity to a
Ramsey problem in a general discrete-time linear-quadratic framework. This framework
includes both exogenous and endogenous state variables. In addition, the equilibrium sys-
tem from the private sector contains both backward-looking and forward-looking dynamics.
Their methods cannot be readily applied to our general framework. Our main contribution
is to provide recursive characterizations and algorithms to solve for the robustly optimal
policy. In addition, unlike Hansen and Sargent (2012) who use the same value of the ro-
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bustness parameter to compare solutions in the three types of Ramsey problem, we make
comparisons by calibrating the context-specific robustness parameter using the same detec-
tion error probability. Importantly, our finding of the differences in impulse responses is
new and absent from their study.
Our paper is also related to Woodford (2010) and Kwon and Miao (2012). Wood-
ford (2010) studies type III ambiguity using a basic New Keynesian model in the timeless
perspective. Kwon and Miao (2012) generalize the Woodford model to a general linear-
quadratic framework. They all show that robustly optimal policy in the timeless perspective
is linear. However, the present paper shows that the robust Ramsey policy is not linear.
One has to use a nonlinear method to derive numerical solutions.
Finally, our paper is related to Hansen and Sargent (2003), Walsh (2004), Giordani and
So¨derlind (2004), Hansen and Sargent (2008, Chapter 16), Leitemo and So¨derstro¨m (2008),
Dennis (2008), and Olalla and Gomez (2011). The robust Ramsey models studied in these
papers are similar to our type I problem. These papers introduce perturbations of the mean
of the exogenous shock processes into the backward- and forward-looking constraints and
a quadratic penalty into the objective function. As Hansen and Sargent (2012) point out,
these models admit a better interpretation when described as type I ambiguity.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the general frame-
work. From section 3 to section 5 we present algorithms for solving robust Ramsey problems
in three types of ambiguity. In section 6 out solution algorithms are applied to a canonical
New Keynesian optimal monetary policy problem with a persistent cost-push shock pro-
cess. Section 7 concludes. An appendix describes the procedure to compute detection error
probabilities.
11
2.2 A Linear-Quadratic Framework
2.2.1 Uncertainty and Beliefs
Uncertainty is generated by a stochastic process of shocks {εt}∞t=1 where εt is an nε ×
1 vector of independently and identically distributed standard normal random variable.
Let εt = {ε1, ..., εt} . At date t, both the Ramsey planner and the private sector have
common information generated by εt and some initial state x0. They may not have rational
expectations in that their subjective beliefs may not coincide with the objective probability
distribution governing exogenous shocks {εt}∞t=1. One reason is that economic agents view
their model as an approximation and thus may be concerned about model misspecification.
Model misspecification is described by a perturbation to the distribution of shocks. We
follow Hansen and Sargent (2008) to represent probability distortions. Let p (ε) denote the
standard normal density of εt. Let Π and Πt denote the induced distribution over the full
state space and the induced joint distribution of εt, respectively. Assume that a distorted
distribution is absolutely continuous with respect to the reference distribution Π. We can
then representing the belief distortion by Radon-Nikodym derivatives.
Let pˆ
(
ε|εt, x0
)
denote an alternative one-step-ahead density for εt+1 conditional on
date t information. Form the likelihood ratio or the Radon-Nikodym derivative for one-
step-ahead distributions:
mt+1 =
pˆ
(
ε|εt, x0
)
p (ε)
.
It satisfies the property
Et [mt+1] = 1, (2.1)
where Et denotes the conditional expectation operator with respect to the reference distri-
bution Π given date t information. Recursively define a martingale {Mt} :
Mt+1 = mt+1Mt, M0 = 1. (2.2)
Mt is a likelihood ratio of the joint densities of ε
t conditional on the initial information x0
12
or the Radon-Nikodym derivative for joint distributions.
Following Hansen and Sargent (2008), we use relative entropy to measure the discrepancy
between the distorted distribution and the reference distribution. Define the relative entropy
(conditional on date zero information) of the distorted distribution associated with Mt over
date t information as E0 [Mt lnMt] . Define the discounted entropy over an infinite horizon
as
(1− β)E0
∞∑
t=0
βtMt lnMt = βE0
∞∑
t=0
βtMtEt (mt+1 lnmt+1) , (2.3)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is a discount factor and we have used (2.2) to derive the equality. Model
ambiguity is described by a set of joint densities {Mt}∞t=0 satisfying the following constraint:
βE0
∞∑
t=0
βtMtEt (mt+1 lnmt+1) ≤ η, (2.4)
for some η > 0.
Woodford (2010) introduces a different measure of intertemporal entropy. First, he
defines the conditional relative entropy of a one-step-ahead distribution given date t infor-
mation as Et [mt+1 lnmt+1]. He then defines the expected discounted entropy conditional
on date zero information as
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt [Et (mt+1 lnmt+1)] = E0
∞∑
j=0
βtmt+1 lnmt+1. (2.5)
In this case, model ambiguity is described by a set of one-step-ahead densities {mt}∞t=1
satisfying the constraint:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtmt+1 lnmt+1 ≤ η0 (2.6)
for some η0 > 0.
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2.2.2 Three Types of Robust Ramsey Problem
Suppose that the equilibrium system from the private sector can be summarized by the
following form:
[
I 0
D21 D22
] [
xt+1
Eˆtyt+1
]
= Aˆ
[
xt
yt
]
+ Bˆut +
[
Ĉx
0
]
εt+1, (2.7)
where x0 = x¯0 is exogenously given and Eˆt denotes the conditional expectation operator
given date t information based on the common beliefs of the private sector. The private
sector’s beliefs may not coincide with the “objective” probability distribution for {εt} , the
reference distribution Π. Here, xt is an nx × 1 vector of predetermined variables in the
sense defined in Klein (2000), yt is an ny × 1 vector of non-predetermined or forward-
looking variables, and ut is an nu × 1 vector of instrument or control variables chosen by
the Ramsey planner. We typically use xt to represent the state of the economy, which may
include productivity shocks, preference shocks, or capital stock. Note that xt may include
a component of unity in order to handle constants. The vector yt represents endogenous
variables such as consumption, inflation rate, and output. Examples of instruments ut
include interest rates and money growth rates. The equation for xt is backward looking
and represents the law of motion of state variables. The equation for yt is forward looking
and typically represents the first-order conditions from intertemporal optimization such as
Euler equations.
All matrices in (3.1) are conformable. For simplicity, we suppose that the matrix on the
left side of equation (3.1) is invertible,4 so that we can multiply both sides of this equation
by its inverse to obtain the system:
[
xt+1
Eˆtyt+1
]
=
[
Axx Axy
Ayx Ayy
] [
xt
yt
]
+
[
Bx
By
]
ut +
[
Cx
0
]
εt+1, (2.8)
where we have partitioned matrices conformably.
4The singular case can be handled by the QZ decomposition method, e.g., Klein (2000) and Sims (2001).
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The Ramsey planner has the period loss function
L (xt, yt, ut) =
1
2
[
x′t, y
′
t
] [ Qxx, Qxy
Q′xy Qyy
] [
xt
yt
]
+
1
2
u′tRut +
[
x′t, y
′
t
] [ Sx
Sy
]
ut,
where the matrices R and
Q ≡
[
Qxx, Qxy
Q′xy Qyy
]
are symmetric. In addition, suppose that Q is positive semidefinite.
If both the private sector and the Ramsey planner have rational expectations, then
they have common beliefs which coincide with Π, the probability distribution governing
exogenous shocks {εt} . In this case, the Ramsey problem is given by
max
{xt,yt,ut}
− E0
∞∑
t=0
βtL (xt, yt, ut) , (2.9)
subject to (3.2) in which the conditional expectation operator Eˆt is equal to Et, the condi-
tional expectation operator with respect to Π.
There is ample experimental and empirical evidence that documents the violation of
the rational expectations hypothesis. We consider three approaches to the modeling of the
departure from rational expectations in the policy analysis. These three approaches give
rise to three types of robust Ramsey policy problem, corresponding to the three types of
ambiguity analyzed by Hansen and Sargent (2012) in a continuous-time framework. In
these problems, the Ramsey planner believes that the private sector experiences no model
ambiguity. But the planner experiences ambiguity. They differ in what the planner is
ambiguous about and the private sector’s beliefs about the exogenous shocks.
Type I Robust Ramsey problem: In this type of problem, the Ramsey planner has a
set of models (probability distributions) centered on the reference model Π, or the so called
“approximating model” by Hansen and Sargent (2008). The Ramsey planner is uncertain
about both the evolution of the exogenous processes and how the private sector views these
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processes. The planner thinks that the private sector knows a model that is distorted
relative to the planner’s approximating model. To cope with its ambiguity, the Ramsey
planner chooses a worst-case model among a set containing the reference approximating
model, while evaluating the private sector’s forward-looking equations using that model.
Formally, the Ramsey planner chooses {mt} to minimize and {xt, yt, ut} to maximize a
multiplier criterion in the following program:5
max
{xt,yt,ut}
min
{mt+1}
− E0
∞∑
t=0
βtMtL (xt, yt, ut) + βθE0
∞∑
t=0
Mtβ
tmt+1 lnmt+1, (2.10)
subject to (4.2), (2.2) and
[
xt+1
Et [mt+1yt+1]
]
=
[
Axx Axy
Ayx Ayy
] [
xt
yt
]
+
[
Bx
By
]
ut +
[
Cx
0
]
εt+1. (2.11)
The parameter θ > 0 penalizes martingales {Mt} with large relative entropies defined
in (2.3). It may be regarded as the Lagrange multiplier for the constraint (2.4). Following
Hansen and Sargent (2001, 2008), instead of solving for the constraint problem subject to
(2.4), we treat θ as a parameter, which measures the planner’s degree of concern for possible
departures from rational expectations, with a small value of θ implying a great degree of
concern for robustness, while a large value of θ implies that only modest departures from
rational expectations are considered plausible. When θ → ∞, the rational expectations
analysis is obtained as a limiting case.
Type II Robust Ramsey problem: In this type of problem, in the spirit of Hansen
and Sargent (2008, chapter 16), the Ramsey planner has a set of models surrounding an
approximating model that the private sector completely trusts. The private sector’s beliefs
are represented by the Ramsey planner’s approximating probability model Π. The Ramsey
planner chooses a worst-case probability model from its set of models, while evaluating the
forward-looking equations for the private sector using the approximating model. Formally,
5See Hansen and Sargent (2001, 2008), Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini (2006a,b), and Strzalecki
(2011) for interpretations and axiomatic foundations.
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type II Ramsey problem is described by
max
{xt,yt,ut}
min
{mt+1}
− E0
∞∑
t=0
βtMtL (xt, yt, ut) + θβE0Mt
∞∑
t=0
βtmt+1 lnmt+1, (2.12)
subject to (4.2), (2.2) and
[
xt+1
Et [yt+1]
]
=
[
Axx Axy
Ayx Ayy
] [
xt
yt
]
+
[
Bx
By
]
ut +
[
Cx
0
]
εt+1. (2.13)
The interpretation of the parameter θ > 0 is the same as in type I robust Ramsey problem.
Type III Robust Ramsey problem: This type of problem is based on Woodford (2010).
The Ramsey planner is assumed to have a single model of the exogenous processes {εt}
and thus no ambiguity along this dimension. Nevertheless, the planner faces ambiguity
because it knows only that the private sector’s model is within a set of probability models
surrounding its own model. The Ramsey planner evaluates the private sector’s forward-
looking equation using a worst-case model and solves the following problem:
max
{xt,yt,ut}
min
{mt+1}
− E0
∞∑
t=0
βtL (xt, yt, ut) + θE0
∞∑
t=0
βtmt+1 lnmt+1, (2.14)
subject to (4.2) and (3.5). Unlike in type I robust Ramsey problem, here the parameter
θ > 0 penalizes one-step-ahead densities {mt} with large relative entropies defined in (4.6).
It may be regarded as the Lagrange multiplier for the constraint (4.7). Following Hansen
and Sargent (2001, 2008), instead of solving for the constraint problem subject to (4.7),
we treat θ as a parameter, which measures the planner’s degree of concern for possible
departures from rational expectations, with a small value of θ implying a great degree of
concern for robustness, while a large value of θ implies that only modest departures from
rational expectations are considered plausible. When θ → ∞, the rational expectations
analysis is obtained as a limiting case.
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2.3 Type I Robust Ramsey Problem
2.3.1 Recursive Formulation
Following Marcet and Marimon (2011) and Hansen and Sargent (2012), we characterize
type I robust Ramsey problem in a recursive form. First, define the Lagrangian expression
for (2.10) as
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt {Mt [−L (xt, yt, ut) + βθmt+1 lnmt+1]}
−E0
∞∑
t=0
βtMtµ
′
yt (Et [mt+1yt+1]−Ayxxt −Ayyyt −Byut) ,
where βtMtµyt is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the forward-looking equation in
(3.5) and the law of motion of the state variable is given by the upper block of equation
(3.5), i.e.,
xt+1 = Axxxt +Axyyt +Bxut + Cxεt+1. (2.15)
Then, introduce a new variable
λyt+1 = µyt, (2.16)
and rewrite the above Lagrangian expression as
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt{Mt (−L (xt, yt, ut) + βθmt+1 lnmt+1)
+Mtµ
′
yt (Ayxxt +Ayyyt +Byut)− β−1Mtλ′ytyt},
where we have used Mt+1 = Mtmt+1. Note that at time zero, we set λy0 = µy,−1 = 0.
Now, we are ready to write type I robust Ramsey problem in a recursive form:
W (xt, λyt,Mt) = max
yt,ut
min
mt+1,µyt
r (xt, yt, ut, λyt, µyt,Mt)
+βEt [W (xt+1, λyt+1,Mt+1) + θMtmt+1 lnmt+1] ,
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subject to (4.2), (2.2), (2.15), and (2.16), where
r (xt, yt, ut, λyt, µyt,Mt)
= −MtL (xt, yt, ut) +Mtµ′yt (Ayxxt +Ayyyt +Byut)− β−1Mtλ′ytyt.
Note that W satisfied the following linear homogeneity property:
W (xt, λyt,Mt) = MtV (xt, λyt) ,
for some function V. We then derive
V (xt, λyt) = max
yt,ut
min
mt+1,µyt
r (xt, yt, ut, λyt, µyt) (2.17)
+βEt [mt+1V (xt+1, λyt+1) + θmt+1 lnmt+1] ,
subject to (4.2), (2.15), and (2.16), where
r (xt, yt, ut, λyt, µyt) = −L (xt, yt, ut) + µ′yt (Ayxxt +Ayyyt +Byut)− β−1λ′ytyt.
This problem is a Robust control problem with backward-looking constraints. The state
variables are (xt, λyt) and the control variables are (yt, ut, µyt,mt+1) .
As is well known from robust control theory (Hansen and Sargent (2008)), there is a
connection to risk-sensitive control. We now derive this connection. From the first-order
condition with respect to mt+1, we can show that
mt+1 =
exp
(−V (xt+1,λyt+1)
θ
)
Et
[
exp
(−V (xt+1,λyt+1)
θ
)] , (2.18)
where Et denotes the conditional expectation operator given the state (xt, λyt) . This equa-
tion gives the worst-case density. Substituting it back to the preceding Bellman equation
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yields:
V (xt, λyt) = max
yt,ut
min
µyt
r (xt, yt, ut, λyt, µyt) + βRt (V ) (xt+1, λyt+1) , (2.19)
subject to (2.15) and (2.16), where
Rt (V ) (xt+1, λyt+1) = −θ ln
[
Et exp
(−V (xt+1, λyt+1)
θ
)]
.
The right-hand side of (2.19) is the objective function in a risk-sensitive control problem.
It is not a standard risk-sensitive control problem because it involves both maximization
and minimization. However, since first-order conditions are identical for both maximization
and minimization, this problem can be solved using the method described in Hansen and
Sargent (2008). In particular, the decision rule is linear and the value function is quadratic
in terms of state variables.
2.3.2 Solution Method
Define the new state vector x∗′t =
(
x′t, λ′yt
)
and the new control vector u∗′t =
(
y′t, u′t, µ′yt
)
.
We can then write the state transition equation as
x∗t+1 = A
∗x∗t +B
∗u∗t + C
∗εt+1, (2.20)
where
A∗ =
[
Axx 0
0 0
]
, B∗ =
[
Axy Bx 0
0 0 I
]
, C∗ =
[
Cx
0
]
.
Conjecture that the value function takes the following form:
V (xt, λyt) = −1
2
x∗′t Px
∗
t −
1
2
d, (2.21)
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where P and d are to be determined. By (2.18) and (3.4), the worst-case likelihood ratio
m∗t+1 satisfies
m∗t+1 ∝ exp
[
1
2θ
ε′t+1C
∗′PC∗εt+1 +
1
θ
ε′t+1C
∗′P (A∗x∗t +B
∗u∗t )
]
,
where ∝ means “proportional.” Thus, the worst-case density satisfies
p∗t+1 = pt+1m
∗
t+1 ∝ exp
[
−1
2
ε′t+1
(
I − 1
θ
C∗′PC∗
)
εt+1
+ε′t+1
(
I − 1
θ
C∗′PC∗
)(
θI − C∗′PC∗)−1C∗′P (A∗x∗t +B∗t u∗t )] .
This implies that p∗t+1 is also a normal density with mean (θI − C∗′PC∗)−1C∗′P (A∗x∗t +B∗u∗t )
and covariance matrix
(
I − θ−1C∗′PC∗)−1 . In this computation, we must assume that the
matrix
(
I − θ−1C∗′PC∗) is nonsingular.
Given (3.4), we can compute that
Rt (V )
(
x∗t+1
)
= −θ ln
[
Et exp
(
1
2θ
x∗′t+1Px
∗
t+1 +
1
2θ
d
)]
= −1
2
(A∗x∗t +B
∗u∗t )
′
[
P + PC∗
(
θI − C∗′PC∗)−1C∗′P] (A∗x∗t +B∗u∗t )
−θ
2
ln det
(
I − 1
θ
C∗′PC∗
)−1
− d
2
.
Substituting this equation into (2.19), we can see that the objective function is quadratic.
Given the linear constraint (2.20), the optimized value will be quadratic and the decision
rule will be linear. This verifies the conjecture in (3.4). Matching coefficients in the Bellman
equation determines the solution for P , d and decision rules.
Instead of using this method, we solve another robust control problem. To this end,
define the return function as:
r∗ (x∗t , u
∗
t ) = −
1
2
x∗′t Q
∗x∗t −
1
2
u∗′t R
∗u∗t − x∗′t S∗u∗t ,
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where
Q∗ =
[
Qxx 0
0 0
]
, R∗ =
 Qyy Sy −A′yyS′y R −B′y
−Ayy −By 0
 , S∗ = [ Qxy Sx −A′yx
β−1 0 0
]
.
The new control problem is given by
max
{yt,ut}
min
{wt+1,µyt}
E
∞∑
t=0
βtr∗ (x∗t , u
∗
t ) +
θ
2
E
∞∑
t=0
βtw′t+1wt+1, (2.22)
subject to
x∗t+1 = A
∗x∗t +B
∗u∗t + C
∗ (εt+1 + wt+1) .
Adapting the arguments in Hansen and Sargent (2008), we can derive the following result.
We omit its proof.
Proposition 1 The decision rule and the value function for problem (3.25) are of the
following form:6
u∗t = −Fux∗t , V ∗ (x∗t ) = −
1
2
x∗′t Px
∗
t −
1
2
d∗,
for some matrices Fu and P and constant d
∗. The decision rule and the matrix P are the
same as those derived from problem (3.22) or (2.19). The solution w∗t+1 to the problem
(3.25) gives the worst-case mean distortion derived from problem (3.22),
w∗t+1 =
(
θI − C∗′PC∗)−1C∗′P (A∗x∗t +B∗t u∗t ) ,
where u∗t = −Fux∗t .
We use the method proposed by Giordani and So¨derlind (2004) to solve problem (3.25).
Specifically, we rewrite this problem as a linear quadratic control problem:
max
{yt,ut}
min
{wt+1,µyt}
− 1
2
E
∞∑
t=0
β
(
x∗′t Q
∗x∗t +
1
2
u˜∗′t R˜
∗u∗t + x
∗′
t S˜
∗u∗t
)
,
6Note that d∗ is not equal to d.
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subject to
x∗t+1 = A
∗x∗t + B˜
∗u˜∗t + C
∗εt+1,
where
R˜∗ =
[
R∗ 0
0 −θI
]
, u∗t =
[
u∗t
wt+1
]
,
S˜∗ =
[
S∗ 0
]
, B˜∗ =
[
B∗ C∗
]
.
Because the first-order conditions are the same for maximization and for minimization, we
can use a standard method for solving a standard linear-quadratic control problem. The
solution is of the following form:
x∗t+1 =
[
xt+1
λyt+1
]
= H
[
xt
λyt
]
+
[
Cx
0
]
εt+1,
u˜∗t =

yt
ut
µyt
wt+1
 = −F [ xtλyt
]
,
for some matrices H and F.
2.4 Type II Robust Ramsey Problem
2.4.1 Recursive Formulation
We follow a similar strategy to derive a recursive formulation of type II robust Ramsey
problem. We first construct the Lagrangian expression for (2.12):
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt{Mt [−L (xt, yt, ut) + βθmt+1 lnmt+1]
−Mtµ′yt (Et [yt+1]−Ayxxt −Ayyyt −Byut)},
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where Mtµyt is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the forward-looking equation in
(3.5). We then define λyt as in (2.16) and rewrite the above Lagrangian as
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt{Mt [−L (xt, yt, ut) + βθmt+1 lnmt+1]
+Mtµ
′
yt (Ayxxt +Ayyyt +Byut)− β−1Mt−1λ′ytyt}.
At time zero, we set λy0 = µy,−1 = 0.
Now, we can derive a recursive formulation of type II robust Ramsey problem:
W (xt, λyt,Mt) = max
yt,ut
min
mt+1,µyt
r (xt, yt, ut, λyt, µyt,Mt)
+βEt [W (xt+1, λyt+1,Mt+1) + θMtmt+1 lnmt+1] ,
subject to (4.2), (2.2), (2.15), and (2.16), where
r (xt, yt, ut, λyt, µyt,Mt)
= −MtL (xt, yt, ut) +Mtµ′yt (Ayxxt +Ayyyt +Byut)− β−1Mt−1λ′ytyt.
Let
W (xt, λyt,Mt) = MtV (xt, λyt,mt) .
We the have
V (xt, λyt,mt) = max
yt,ut
min
mt+1,µyt
r (xt, yt, ut, λyt, µyt,mt)
+βEt [mt+1V (xt+1, λyt+1,mt+1) + θmt+1 lnmt+1] ,
subject to (4.2) and (2.15), where
r (xt, yt, ut, λyt, µyt,mt) = −L (xt, yt, ut) + µ′yt (Ayxxt +Ayyyt +Byut)− β−1m−1t λ′ytyt.
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We can reduce the dimension of the state space by defining
ξyt = m
−1
t λyt = m
−1
t µyt−1. (2.23)
Now, the Bellman equation becomes
V (xt, ξyt) = max
yt,ut
min
mt+1,µyt
r (xt, yt, ut, ξyt, µyt) (2.24)
+βEt
[
mt+1V
(
xt+1,m
−1
t+1µyt
)
+ θmt+1 lnmt+1
]
,
subject to (4.2) and (2.15), where
r (xt, yt, ut, ξyt, µyt) = −L (xt, yt, ut) + µ′yt (Ayxxt +Ayyyt +Byut)− β−1ξ′ytyt. (2.25)
Unlike the solution to type I robust Ramsey problem, here the decision rule is not linear
and the value function is not quadratic. One way to solve type II robust Ramsey problem
is to use a nonlinear method to solve the above dynamic programming problem. Another
method is to use perturbation around θ =∞ or γ = 1/θ = 0 (Hansen and Sargent (2012)).
2.4.2 Solution Method
Set up the Lagrangian expression for (2.24):
r (xt, yt, ut, ξyt, µyt) + βEt
[
mt+1V
(
xt+1,m
−1
t+1µyt
)
+ θmt+1 lnmt+1
]
−φt (Etmt+1 − 1)− Etξ′xt+1 (xt+1 −Axxxt −Axyyt −Bxut) ,
25
where φt and ξxt+1 are the Lagrange multipliers associated with (4.2) and (2.15). First-order
conditions are given by7
mt+1 : 0 = β
[
V
(
xt+1,m
−1
t+1µyt
)−m−1t+1µ′ytV2 (xt+1,m−1t+1µyt)+ θ (1 + lnmt+1)]− φt,
(2.26)
yt : 0 = −L2 (xt, yt, ut) +A′yyµyt − β−1ξyt +A′xyEtξxt+1, (2.27)
ut : 0 = −L3 (xt, yt, ut) +B′yµyt +B′xEtξxt+1, (2.28)
µyt : 0 = Ayxxt +Ayyyt +Byut + βEtV2
(
xt+1,m
−1
t+1µyt
)
, (2.29)
xt+1 : 0 = βmt+1V1
(
xt+1,m
−1
t+1µyt
)− ξxt+1. (2.30)
Envelope conditions are given by
V1 (xt, ξyt) = −L1 (xt, yt, ut) +A′yxµyt + EtA′xxξxt+1, (2.31)
V2 (xt, ξyt) = −β−1yt. (2.32)
Leading (2.32) by one period and substituting it into (2.26) and (2.29), we obtain
mt+1 : 0 = β
[
Vt+1 + β
−1m−1t+1µ
′
ytyt+1 + θ (1 + lnmt+1)
]− φt, (2.33)
µyt : 0 = Ayxxt +Ayyyt +Byut − Etyt+1. (2.34)
Taking one period lag in equation (2.30) and using (2.31), we obtain
xt+1 : 0 = βmt
(−L1 (xt, yt, ut) +A′yxµyt + EtA′xxξxt+1)− ξxt. (2.35)
7By definition of L, we can compute
L1 (xt, yt, ut) = Qxxxt +Qxyyt + Sxut,
L2 (xt, yt, ut) = Qyyyt +Q
′
xyxt + Syut,
L3 (xt, yt, ut) = Rut + S
′
xxt + S
′
yyt.
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Using (2.33) and (4.2), can can derive
mt+1 =
exp
(−1θ [V (zt+1, ξt+1) + β−1ξ′yt+1yt+1])
Et exp
(
−1θ
[
V (zt+1, ξt+1) + β−1ξ′yt+1yt+1
]) . (2.36)
We then obtain a system of 8 equations, (2.27), (2.28), (2.34), (2.35), (2.23), (2.15),
(2.36), and
Vt = r (xt, yt, ut, ξyt, µyt) + βEt [mt+1Vt+1 + θmt+1 lnmt+1] ,
for 8 variables xt, yt, ut, µyt, ξxt, ξyt, mt+1, and Vt. The predetermined variables are xt and
ξyt. The other variables are nonpredetermined. We can use Dynare to solve for a second-
order approximate solution.
2.4.3 An Equivalence Result
The following proposition shows that Type II robust Ramsey problem is equivalent to a
standard Ramsey problem with recursive utility or risk-sensitive utility.
Proposition 2 Type II robust Ramsey problem is equivalent to the following problem:
max
{xt,yt,ut}
V0
subject to (2.13), where Vt satisfies
Vt = −L (xt, yt, ut) + βRt (Vt+1) , for all t ≥ 0.
We omit its proof. The basic idea is to define Vt as
Vt = −L (xt, yt, ut) + min{mt+1:Etmt+1=1}β (Etmt+1Vt+1 + θmt+1 lnmt+1)
= −L (xt, yt, ut) + βRt (Vt+1) ,
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where the second line follows from a straightforward computation. By a dynamic program-
ming argument (e.g., Hansen and Sargent (2008) and Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini
(2006a)), V0 satisfies
V0 = min{mt+1}
− E0
∞∑
t=0
βtMtL (xt, yt, ut) + θβE0Mt
∞∑
t=0
βtmt+1 lnmt+1.
Therefore, we obtain Proposition 2.
2.5 Type III Robust Ramsey Problem
2.5.1 Recursive Formulation
Form the Lagrangian expression for problem (3.4):
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{−L (xt, yt, ut) + θmt+1 lnmt+1 − µ′yt (Et [mt+1yt+1]−Ayxxt −Ayyyt −Byut)} ,
where βtµyt is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the forward-looking equation in (3.5).
We then define λyt as in (2.16) and rewrite the above Lagrangian as
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt{−L (xt, yt, ut) + θmt+1 lnmt+1 + µ′yt (Ayxxt +Ayyyt +Byut)− β−1λ′ytmtyt},
At time zero, we set λy0 = µy,−1 = 0.
Now, we can derive a recursive formulation of type III robust Ramsey problem:
V (xt, λyt,mt) = max
yt,ut
min
mt+1,µyt
r (xt, yt, ut, λyt, µyt,mt)
+Et [βV (xt+1, λyt+1) + θmt+1 lnmt+1] ,
subject to (4.2) and (2.15) where
r (xt, yt, ut, λyt, µyt,mt) = −L (xt, yt, ut) + µ′yt (Ayxxt +Ayyyt +Byut)− β−1λ′ytmtyt.
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We can reduce the dimension of the state space by defining
ξyt = mtλyt = mtµyt−1. (2.37)
Then, the Bellman equation becomes
V (xt, ξyt) = max
yt,ut
min
mt+1,µyt
r (xt, yt, ut, ξyt, µyt) (2.38)
+Et [βV (xt+1,mt+1µyt) + θmt+1 lnmt+1] ,
subject to (4.2) and (2.15), where
r (xt, yt, ut, λyt, µyt,mt) = −L (xt, yt, ut) + µ′yt (Ayxxt +Ayyyt +Byut)− β−1ξ′ytyt.
Comparing this Bellman equation with that for type II robust Ramsey problem, we find that
the period return function is identical. But the continuation values are different because
the belief-adjustment is different as revealed by (2.23) and (2.37).
2.5.2 Solution Method
Set up the Lagrangian expression for (2.38):
r (xt, yt, ut, ξyt, µyt) + Et [βV (xt+1,mt+1µyt) + θmt+1 lnmt+1]− φt (Etmt+1 − 1)
−Etξ′xt+1 (xt+1 −Axxxt −Axyyt −Bxut) ,
where φt and ξxt+1 are the Lagrange multipliers associated with (4.2) and (2.15). First-order
conditions are given by
mt+1 : 0 = βµ
′
ytV2 (xt+1,mt+1µyt) + θ (1 + lnmt+1)− φt, (2.39)
yt : 0 = −L2 (xt, yt, ut) +A′yyµyt − β−1ξyt + EtA′xyξxt+1, (2.40)
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ut : 0 = −L3 (xt, yt, ut) +B′yµyt +B′xEtξxt+1, (2.41)
µyt : 0 = Ayxxt +Ayyyt +Byut + βEtmt+1V2 (xt+1,mt+1µyt) , (2.42)
xt+1 : 0 = βV1 (xt+1,mt+1µyt)− ξxt+1. (2.43)
Envelope conditions are given by
V1 (xt, ξyt) = −L1 (xt, yt, ut) +A′yxµyt +A′xxEtξxt+1, (2.44)
V2 (xt, ξyt) = −β−1yt. (2.45)
Leading (2.45) by one period and substituting it into (2.39) and (2.42) yields:
mt+1 : 0 = θ (1 + lnmt+1)− µ′ytyt+1 − φt, (2.46)
µyt : 0 = Ayxxt +Ayyyt +Byut − Etmt+1yt+1 (2.47)
Taking one period lag in (2.43) and using (2.44) yields:
xt+1 : ξxt = β
(−L1 (xt, yt, ut) +A′yxµyt+1 +A′xxEtξxt+1) . (2.48)
Using (4.2) and (2.46), we can derive
mt+1 =
exp
(
θ−1µ′ytyt+1
)
Et
[
exp
(
θ−1µ′ytyt+1
)] . (2.49)
We then obtain a system of 7 equations (2.40) (2.41), (2.47), (2.48), (2.15), (2.37), and
(2.49) for 7 variables xt, yt, ut, µyt, ξxt, ξyt,and mt+1. The predetermined state variables are
xt and ξyt. The other variables are nonpredetermined. We can use Dynare to solve for a
linear approximate solution or a second-order approximate solution.
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2.6 Applications to Monetary Policy
In this section, we apply our general theory to the study of robustly optimal monetary
policy in a basic New Keynesian model. The objective function of the central bank (or CB)
under rational expectations is given by
max
{xt,pit}
−1
2
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
pi2t + λ(xt − x∗)2
]
, (2.50)
where pit and xt denote inflation and the output gap, respectively, β is the discount factor
of the private sector and λ is a weight the CB places on the stabilization of the output
gap variability. Here, x∗ ≥ 0 denotes the distortion in the objective of the CB towards a
positive output gap. A positive x∗ implies that the CB has a pro-growth bias.
Under rational expectations, the CB faces the following New Keynesian Phillips Curve
(hereafter, NKPC):
pit = κxt + βEtpit+1 + zt. (2.51)
where β is a discount factor shared with the policymaker. Here, zt denotes the cost-push
shock which is assumed to follow an AR(1) process:
zt = ρzzt−1 + σzεt, εt ∼ N (0, 1), (2.52)
where ρz ∈ [0, 1) denotes the AR(1) coefficient and σz > 0 represents the standard deviation
of a new innovation in cost-push shocks. Here, εt is an independently and identically
distributed standard normal random variable.
2.6.1 Robust Ramsey Policy
Now, consider robust Ramsey policy. We use the methods introduced in Sections 3-5 to
derive this policy for the three types of robust Ramsey monetary policy problem. For type
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I ambiguity, we can derive the first-order conditions:
pit = β
−1 (µpit − µpi,t−1) , (2.53)
µpit = −λβ
κ
(xt − x∗) , (2.54)
where µpit is the Lagrange multiplier associated with distorted NKPC:
pit = κxt + βEt [mt+1pit+1] + zt. (2.55)
The above first-order conditions are the same as in the case of rational expectations. The
difference is that the distribution of the shock process is distorted. Substituting (2.53) and
(2.54) into (2.55), we obtain a difference equation for µpit. Unlike in the case of rational
expectations, type I ambiguity causes the expectation in this difference equation to be
distorted. Under the worst-case distribution, the density is given by
mt+1 =
exp
(−1
θ V (zt+1, µpit)
)
Et
[
exp
(−1
θ V (zt+1, µpit)
)] ,
where V is the value function for type I ambiguity. This means that the CB attaches
more weight to states when continuation values are low. As we show in Section 3.2, V is
quadratic, mt+1 is a normal density, and type I robust policy is linear in the state variables
zt and µpit. The state variable µpit encodes the history and generates history dependency of
the optimal monetary policy.
For type II ambiguity, the first-order conditions are given by (2.54),
pit = β
−1 (µpit − ξt) , (2.56)
φt = βV (zt+1, ξt+1)− ξt+1pit+1 + βθ (1 + lnmt+1) , (2.57)
where µpit and φt are the Lagrange multipliers associated with (2.51) and (1), respectively,
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and ξt is the belief-adjusted Lagrange multiplier defined as
ξt = m
−1
t µpit−1, t ≥ 1, ξ0 = µpi,−1 = 0.
Here, V is the value function for type II ambiguity. Using (1) to eliminate φt yields
mt+1 =
exp
(−1θ [V (zt+1, ξt+1)− β−1ξt+1pit+1])
Et exp
(−1θ [V (zt+1, ξt+1)− β−1ξt+1pit+1]) .
This equation implies that the CB puts more weight on the states with low continuation
values. Type II robust policy is a nonlinear function of the state variables, the shock zt and
the belief-adjusted Lagrange multiplier ξt.
Substituting (2.56) into (2.51), we obtain a difference equation for ξt. To solve this
equation, we need to know the belief distortion represented by the density mt, which in
turn must be solved jointly with the value function V.
For type III ambiguity, the first-order conditions are still given by (2.54) and (2.56), but
where µpit is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the distorted NKPC (2.55) and
ξt = mtµpit−1, t ≥ 1, ξ0 = µpi,−1 = 0.
We can solve for the distorted belief as
mt+1 =
exp
(
θ−1µpitpit+1
)
Et [exp (θ−1µpitpit+1)]
. (2.58)
Equations (2.54), (2.56), (2.55) and (2.58), together with the definition of ξt determine
pit, xt,mt, ξt, and µpit. We can eliminate µpit and represent the type III robust policy as a
nonlinear function of the predetermined state variables zt and ξt.
Note that equation (2.58) implies that when the Lagrange multiplier µpit is positive, the
CB’s concern for robustness causes it to assign higher probabilities to more inflationary
states. Similarly, when µpit < 0, the CB worries that less inflationary or more deflationary
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states are more likely than under its approximating model. Clearly, the above equations
imply that type III robust policy is nonlinear. This is different from the linear robust policy
in the timeless perspective studied by Woodford (2010) and Kwon and Miao (2012).
2.6.2 Calibration
To illustrate the quantitative impact of a concern for robustness, we take the same parameter
values as in Woodford (2010) and Kwon and Miao (2012): β = 0.99, κ = 0.2, λ = 0.08,
x∗ = 0.05.8 Also we assume that ρz = 0.5 and σz = 0.02.
Now the only remaining parameter to be calibrated is θ, which measures the degree
of concerns for robustness. We apply the detection error probability method proposed by
Hansen and Sargent (2008). The detection error probability gives the probability that an
econometrician cannot correctly figure out the true data generating process (DGP) after
observing a series of data, especially when she has two competing candidates of the DGP. If
two models (or DGPs) are almost identical, the detection error probability is close to 50%,
which implies that there is roughly a 50-50 chance to make an error about which model
generates an observed series of data. In other words, it is almost impossible to differentiate
the two models. The detection error probability becomes close to zero when two competing
models are very different so that the econometrician can almost always detect the true DGP.
Specifically, the detection error probability can be computed using log-likelihood ratios:
1
2
Pr
(
log
LA
LW
> 0
∣∣∣∣W)+ 12 Pr
(
log
LW
LA
> 0
∣∣∣∣A) ,
where LA (LW ) denotes the likelihood of model A (W ). One can consider A represents an
approximating model and W means the worst-case one. Pr (·|A) denotes the probability
conditional on the hypothesis that model A is a true one.
For type I robust Ramsey problem, the detection error probability can be easily com-
puted using the Kalman filter since the solution is linear and the shock process is Gaussian.9
8Hansen and Sargent (2012) also used similar values.
9See Giordani and So¨derlind (2004) for detailed information.
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Since we solve type II and type II robust Ramsey problems using the second-order approx-
imation method, solutions to these types are not linear any more. Not surprisingly, it is
generally very difficult to find the exact likelihood even if the shock process is Gaussian.
Therefore, we approximate likelihoods using particle filtering. The particle filter enables
us to evaluate the likelihood numerically via the sequential Monte Carlo algorithm when a
model is non-linear and/or non-Gaussian. Ferna´ndez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramı´rez (2007)
show that particle filtering can be used to calculate likelihoods of DSGE models when
solved with non-linear methods, particularly in their case, a second-order approximation.
More recently, Bidder and Smith (2010) apply this method to compute the detection error
probability. Appendix A details our computation procedure.
We calibrate θ such that the detection error probability is approximately 10% for each
type of robust Ramsey problem. We use simulated time series of 150 periods and simulate
1,200 times to calculate the detection error probability.10 Also we use 100,000 particles to
evaluate the likelihood. Note that since type I ambiguity yields a linear solution, we use
the Kalman filter to obtain the likelihood function in a state space framework. Table 2.1
shows calibrated values of θ.
Table 2.1: Calibrated values of θ
Type I Type II Type III
0.0069 0.7611 0.0151
2.6.3 Numerical Results
Figures 2·1-2·3 plot the impulse responses of inflation and the output gap following a positive
unexpected one standard deviation cost-push shock for the three types of robust Ramsey
problem and the Ramsey problem under rational expectations with θ =∞.
10Note that there is a tradeoff between accuracy and speed as the number of particles increases. Exploiting
Matlab parallel computing with 32 cores, it took about 40 minutes for 1,200 simulations using 100,000
particles to compute the detection error probability corresponding to a single value of θ. Bidder and Smith
(2012) use as many as 160,000 particles. We also checked the detection error probability corresponding to
our calibrated vaule of θ using 160,000 particles but the difference between the two results was negligible.
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Figure 2·1: Impulse responses of inflation and output under type I ambi-
guity.
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Note: Dashed lines represent impulse responses under rational expectations. Solid lines plot impulse
responses under type I ambiguity. The time period is quarterly.
An important finding is that optimal monetary policy becomes more history-dependent
when the policymaker faces model ambiguity irrespective of its type. More history de-
pendent monetary policy implies that it takes a longer time for the policymaker to return
inflation and the output gap to their steady state levels. Although monetary policy be-
comes more history dependent for all three types of ambiguity, there are subtle differences
in reasons behind this result. For type I ambiguity, the CB faces ambiguity about both
the shock process and private agents’ expectations. As we show in Section 6.1, the private
sector’s expectations in the difference equation for µpit or the commitment value are dis-
torted under the worst-case beliefs. This makes the robustly optimal monetary policy more
history dependent than that under rational expectations.
For type II ambiguity, the CB does not suffer from ambiguity about private agents’
beliefs but it does not trust its approximating model of the exogenous shock process. The
CB believes that the cost-push shock is more persistent than under rational expectations,
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Figure 2·2: Impulse responses of inflation and output under type II ambi-
guity.
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Note: Dashed lines represent impulse responses under rational expectations. Solid lines plot impulse
responses under type II ambiguity. The time period is quarterly.
causing the robust monetary policy more history dependent. Note that even though the
Ramsey policymaker fully trusts the private sector’s beliefs, its concern for robustness leads
to a change in the policy rule for inflation as shown in (2.56). Type II ambiguity generates
endogenous belief heterogeneity. The state variable that encodes the history is the belief-
adjusted Lagrange multiplier associated with the NKPC. The evolution of this state variable
explains the more history dependence of Type II robust policy.
For type III ambiguity, the CB fully trusts its approximating model of the shock pro-
cess, but is uncertain about agents’ beliefs. More history-dependence comes from the CB’s
concern for robustness of agents’ beliefs. This can better manage agents’ expectations as
Woodford (2010) argues. The state variable that encodes history is the belief-adjusted La-
grange multiplier associated with the distorted NKPC. Like Type II ambiguity, type III
ambiguity also generates endogenous belief heterogeneity. But the belief adjustment and
the evolution of the belief-adjusted Lagrange multiplier are different.
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Figure 2·3: Impulse responses of inflation and output under type III am-
biguity.
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Note: Dashed lines represent impulse responses under rational expectations. Solid lines plot impulse
responses under type III ambiguity. The time period is quarterly.
Even though all three types of ambiguity share the common feature of making monetary
policy more history dependent, the implications for the price level are not the same across all
there types. The left panel of Figure 2·4 plots the impulse responses of the price level under
type I ambiguity (solid line) and under rational expectations (dashed line). The robust
policy for inflation implies that once a cost-push shock hits the economy, it is optimal to
undo all the changes in the price level so that it returns to its steady state level. This
implies that type I robustly optimal monetary policy is price level targeting, just like in the
case of rational expectations. The middle and right panels of Figure 2·4 plot the impulse
responses for types II and III ambiguity. The robust policy indicates that in response to a
positive cost-push shock the CB adjusts the inflation rate to a degree so that the price level
goes below its original level. This implies that under types II and III ambiguity, price level
targeting is not an optimal policy any more. Note that our finding is in line with Woodford
(2010) and Kwon and Miao (2012). The difference is that they find this feature of monetary
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Figure 2·4: Impulse responses of the price level.
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Note: Dashed lines represent impulse responses under rational expectations. Solid lines plot impulse
responses under three types of ambiguity. The time period is quarterly.
policy under type III ambiguity in the timeless perspective instead of the Ramsey framework
as in this paper.
Figure 2·5 shows the initial responses of inflation and output gap for various values of
the robustness parameter θ. The inverse θ−1 describes the degree of concerns for robustness
or ambiguity aversion. The initial responses under rational expectations correspond to
θ−1 = 0. Note that when θ is smaller than around 0.3, the solution reaches the breakdown
point pointed out by Hansen and Sargent (2008) and hence we restrict solution for type II
problem in a small interval.
An interesting and important finding is that different types of ambiguity deliver different
initial responses to a positive cost-push shock. For type I ambiguity, the initial responses of
inflation and the output gap are larger than those under rational expectations. Since type
I ambiguity is related to the overall model misspecification, in the worst case scenario, the
CB worries that the cost-push shock is distorted in mean so that the CB responds more
aggressively as if the shock were greater compared to that in the approximating model.
At the same time the CB concerns that the private agents’ expectations are distorted to a
higher level too.
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Figure 2·5: Initial responses of inflation and output
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Note: The horizontal axis represents the degree of concerns for robustness θ−1. The case of
θ−1 = 0 corresponds to rational expectations.
For type II ambiguity, the initial response of inflation is also greater than under rational
expectations. The difference between type I and type II lies in the initial response of the
output gap. While type I ambiguity makes the initial response of the output gap greater
than under rational expectations, type II ambiguity leads to a less responsive output gap.
The intuition is the following: The CB worries about the unfavorable distortion in the cost-
push shock, leading to an increase in the inflation response. On the other hand, the CB
exploits the fact that the private sector fully trusts its model and in its model the cost-push
shock is believed less persistent than under the CB’s distorted beliefs. As a result, the CB
faces a smaller tradeoff between inflation and output.
Finally, for type III ambiguity, the CB’s initial response of inflation to a positive cost-
push shock is less sensitive but the initial response of the output gap is more sensitive. The
concern for robustness of the expectation of the private sector makes the CB manage the
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inflation expectation more cautiously. In other words, the CB puts more effort to stabilize
inflation and the inflation expectation since it worries that the private agents’ inflation
expectations are biased upward. In this case, the CB faces a larger tradeoff between inflation
and the output gap. This result is in line with Woodford (2010) and Kwon and Miao (2012).
In these papers, they focus on the linear class of policy rules in the timeless perspective.
Our finding shows that their finding is still valid in the Ramsey framework.
2.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we study three types of robust Ramsey problem corresponding to three types
of ambiguity pointed by Hansen and Sargent (2012) in a general linear-quadratic framework.
We provide recursive characterizations and algorithms to solve the robust Ramsey policy.
We apply our methods to a basic New Keynesian model of optimal monetary policy with
persistent cost-push shocks.
There are three main findings. First, robust Ramsey monetary policy for all three types
of ambiguity generates more history dependence than under rational expectations. Second,
in response to a positive cost-push shock, the price level eventually returns to the initial
level for type I ambiguity and rational expectations. But the sign of the initial price level
effect is eventually reversed for types II and III ambiguity. Third, the initial response of
inflation is more aggressive for types I and II ambiguity than for rational expectations,
but it is less aggressive for type III ambiguity. The initial response of the output gap is
more aggressive fort types I and III ambiguity than for rational expectations, but it is less
responsive for type II ambiguity.
Our type III ambiguity corresponds to that studied by Woodford (2010) and Kwon and
Miao (2013). They study linear robust monetary policy in the timeless perspective. We
show that robust Ramsey monetary policy is nonlinear, but the general properties of robust
policy (history dependence, price level dynamics, and impulse responses) found in their
papers are still valid in our Ramsey framework.
Our analysis highlights the importance of modeling who faces ambiguity and what the
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policymaker is ambiguous about because different types of ambiguity generate very different
policy responses to shocks.
For future research, it would be interesting to study micro-founded models of robust
policy. Adam and Woodford (2012) solve an optimal monetary policy problem under type
III ambiguity with a micro-founded model. They use linear approximation methods to solve
the model. It would be interesting to study different types of ambiguity in a micro-founded
model with non-linear solutions.
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Appendix
2.A Computing Detection Error Probabilities
We can write the solution to a robust Ramsey problem in a state space representation:
st = F (st−1, εt),
y˜t = G(st),
where st and y˜t denote unobservable hidden states and endogenous variables at time t,
respectively. F (·) and G(·) are system and observation functions, respectively, which are
possibly non-linear. Here, εt denotes a system innovation. To apply the particle filter-
ing algorithm, we assume that the endogenous variables are observable with measurement
errors:
yt = G(st) + vt, (2.A.1)
where vt is a measurement error.
Note that according to Bayes’ theorem the likelihood of yt ≡ {y0, y1, · · · , yt} under the
hypothesis of θ ∈ Θ is given by
p
(
yt ; θ
)
= p (y0 ; θ)
t∏
k=1
p
(
yk
∣∣ yk−1 ; θ) , (2.A.2)
where p (y0 ; θ) denotes a prior probability which is assumed to be known. Generally, one
cannot compute the likelihood analytically. The key idea of the particle filtering algorithm
is to approximate the likelihood through Monte Carlo simulation.
More concretely, note that one can rewrite the last term of (2.A.2) as
p
(
yk
∣∣ yk−1 ; θ) = ∫ p (yk ∣∣ sk ; θ) p(sk ∣∣ yk−1 ; θ) dsk,
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which can be approximated using discrete samples:
p
(
yk
∣∣ yk−1 ; θ) ≈ 1
N
N∑
i=1
p
(
yk
∣∣ sik ; θ) p(sik ∣∣ yk−1 ; θ) .
Now let
{
wik, s
i
k
}N
i=1
be a swarm of particles such that sit is randomly drawn from p
(
sik
∣∣ sik−1 ; θ)
and also the importance weight wit is computed recursively
11 by
wit = p
(
yk
∣∣ sik ; θ) wik−1∑wik−1 .
It is important to notice that
{
wik, s
i
k
}N
i=1
is a discrete approximation to the distribution
p
(
yk
∣∣ sk ; θ) p(sk ∣∣ yk−1 ; θ)
which is justified by the law of large numbers as the number of particles N increases. Thus,
one can find that the likelihood function can be approximated by
p
(
yk
∣∣ yk−1 ; θ) ≈ 1
N
N∑
i=1
wit.
Notice that if one resamples sjk from
{
wik, s
i
k
}N
i=1
with replacement one can update a swarm
of particles to
{
N−1, sjk
}N
j=1
. This procedure is called the sampling importance resam-
pling.12
To sum up, we implement the particle filtering algorithm using the following procedure:
11By using q
(
sik
∣∣ yk−1) as the importance sampling distribution of p (sik ∣∣ yk) one can find that the
importance weight wit can be expressed recursively:
wik ∝
p
(
sik
∣∣ yk)
q
(
sik
∣∣ yk−1) ∝ p
(
yk
∣∣ sik) p (sik ∣∣ sik−1)
q
(
sik
∣∣ sik−1, yt−1) p
(
sik−1
∣∣ yk−1)
q
(
sik−1
∣∣ yk−2) ∝ wik−1p(yk ∣∣ sik) .
Since q
(
sik
∣∣ yk−1) can be chosen arbitrarily, one can easily sample sik such that
sik i.i.d.˜ q
(
sk
∣∣ yk−1) ⇒ qˆ (s ∣∣ yk−1) = 1
N
∑
δsi
k
(s),
where δ (·) is the Dirac delta function.
12There are various approaches to resampling but in this paper we follow an algorithm called systemic
resampling suggested by Kitagawa (1996).
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• FOR t = 2 : T , given a swarm of particles {wit, sit}Ni=1, draw sit+1 ∼ p (s ∣∣ sit ; θ) .
• Update wit+1 = p
(
yt+1
∣∣ sit+1 ; θ)wit (∑wit)−1 .
• Compute the conditional likelihood Lt+1 = N−1
∑
wit+1.
• Resample {wit+1, sit+1}Ni=1 from {wjt+1, sjt+1}Nj=1 with replacement such that sit+1 ∼
i.i.d.
{
wit+1, s
i
t+1
}N
i=1
and wit+1 = N
−1.
• t = t+ 1.
• END FOR.
While implementing particle filtering, an issue needing our caution is that in type II
robust Ramsey problem, the worst-case shock process is different from the reference pro-
cess. Note that for type III, the shock process is not distorted but only beliefs of a Ramsey
planner about private agents’ expectations are distorted. To derive the worst-case distribu-
tion, one can do Monte-Carlo simulations and compute the one-step-ahead likelihood ratio,
mt+1(st+1). Then one can draw the distorted shock according to the distorted probability.
The problem is that it makes the computing time very long. Instead we take a simpler and
more practical way to draw distorted shocks. By the second-order approximation we can
express mt+1 in terms of state variables. Then we can compute the conditional mean of the
distorted shock by
Et[mt+1et+1] = Et [Gm (st, et+1) et+1] (2.A.3)
where Gm (·) denotes decision rule for mt+1 given st. The distortion in mean at time t+ 1
depends on state variables at time t and a innovation shock et+1 so that it is now easy to
compute. Bidder and Smith (2012) also take a similar approach.
After finding the conditional mean, we generate the worst-case shocks for each state by
randomly drawing a number from the normal distribution N (Et [mt+1et+1] , 1). In other
words, we simply assume that the worst-case distribution distorts only the mean of the
shock process. We confirm this assumption by Monte-Carlo simulations following Bidder
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and Smith (2012). We find that the variance of the worst-case shock is not different from
that of the reference shock process and we cannot not find any significant difference between
two distributions except for the mean. The gain from reducing computing time, however,
is very significant.
Finally, the likelihood can be computed as
L (yT ; θ) =
T∏
t=1
Lt.
In order to implement particle filtering, we first generate a set of simulated time series
using the solution to the robust Ramsey problem. In our model, there are three hidden
state variables (zt, µpit, ξt) and two observable variables pit and xt. We assume that the mea-
surement error of each observable variable follows a normal distribution with the standard
deviation of 20% unconditional counterpart of each variable, i.e.,
[
xt
pit
]
= G(st) +
[
σxex,t
σpiepi,t
]
,
[
ex
epi
]
∼ N
([
0
0
]
,
[
1 0
0 1
])
.
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Chapter 3
Woodford’s Approach to Robust Policy Analysis
in a Linear-Quadratic Framework (with Jianjun
Miao)
Abstract
This essay extends Woodford’s (2010) approach to the robustly optimal monetary policy to a
general linear quadratic framework. We provide algorithms to solve for a time-invariant lin-
ear robustly optimal policy in a timeless perspective and for a time-invariant linear Markov
perfect equilibrium under discretion. We apply our methods to a New Keynesian model of
monetary policy with persistent cost-push shocks and inflation persistence. We find that
the robustly optimal commitment inflation is less responsive to a cost-push shock when
the shock is more persistent, and that the robustly optimal discretionary policy is more
responsive to lagged inflation when inflation is more persistent.
3.1 Introduction
The traditional policy analysis has been typically conducted under the rational expectations
hypothesis. While we have learned many lessons from this hypothesis, there are several good
reasons for us to think about departures from it. First, the Ellsberg (1961) paradox and
related experimental evidence demonstrate that there is a distinction between risk and
ambiguity. Risk refers to the situation where there is a known probability distribution over
the state of the world, while ambiguity refers to the situation where the information is too
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vague to be adequately summarized by a single probability distribution. As a result, a
decision maker may have multiple priors in mind (Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)). Second,
as Anderson, Hansen and Sargent (2003) and Hansen and Sargent (2001, 2008) point out,
economic agents view economic models as an approximation to the true model. They believe
that economic data come from an unknown member of a set of unspecified models near the
approximating model. Concern about model misspecification induces a decision maker to
want robust decision rules that work over that set of nearby models.1
The above arguments are especially relevant for policy analysis in which uncertainty
and expectations play an important role. Either the policymaker or the private agents may
not have complete confidence in the likelihood of the state of the world and hence face
model ambiguity. Several possibilities may arise.2 First, the policymaker does not trust
its approximating model, but the private agents do. The policymaker forms expectations
using a model in a set of nearby models surrounding its approximating model. Hansen
and Sargent (2003 and 2008, Chapter 16) study this case. Woodford (2010) studies a
second case in which the policymaker trusts its approximating model, but it has ambiguity
about the private agents’ beliefs about the model. The policymaker thinks that the private
agents may form expectations using any model in a set of nearby models surrounding the
policymaker’s approximating model. The Hansen-Sargent approach seems well understood
and several computation algorithms in the linear-quadratic framework have been proposed
in the literature (e.g., Hansen and Sargent (2008), Giordani and Soderlind (2008), Dennis
(2008), Leitemo, and Soderstrom (2009)). However, little is known about how to conduct
robust policy analysis using the Woodford approach in a general linear-quadratic framework.
This paper fills this gap by proposing algorithms for solving robustly optimal policy un-
der both timeless perspective commitment and discretion. Our algorithms borrow insights
from Woodford (2010), who derives analytical solutions for a basic New Keynesian model.
We focus on conditionally linear policy rules under timeless perspective commitment and
1There is a growing literature on the applications of robustness and ambiguity to finance and macroeco-
nomics, e.g., Epstein and Wang (1994); Hansen (2007); and Ju and Miao (2012); among others.
2See Hansen and Sargent (2012) for a discussion of different types of ambiguity.
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linear Markov perfect equilibria (MPE) under discretion. We show that robustly optimal
conditionally linear policy and a linear Markov perfect equilibrium can exist given certain
conditions. Our algorithms then reduce to solving for linear decision rules using tools from
the literature on solving linear rational expectations models and linear-quadratic control
problems.
We apply our algorithms to a New Keynesian model with a persistent cost-push shock
and inflation persistence. The Woodford (2010) model is a special case of our model.
We confirm Woodford’s (2010) major findings for the case of purely temporary shocks
that (i) the robustly optimal inflation is less responsive to the current cost-push shock,
and (ii) the robustly optimal inflation is more history-dependent compared to the case of
rational expectations. We also find some new comparative statics results: (i) When the cost-
push shock becomes more persistent, robustly optimal inflation is less responsive to it, but
the robustly optimal output gap is more responsive. By contrast, optimal inflation under
rational expectations is more responsive to a cost-push shock when it is more persistent.
(ii) In addition, the robust discretionary policy becomes more costly and the range of
parameters for the existence of a linear MPE shrinks. (iii) When the steady state is more
inefficient, the robustly optimal inflation is less responsive to the cost-push shock.
As Woodford (2010) points out, the central bank is not willing to let inflation increase
in response to a positive cost-push shock when it is faced with a concern for robustness.
The central bank fears that a large shock in inflation might affect the inflation expectation
of private agents unfavorably to the central bank and thus the output-inflation trade-off
might worsen if it allows inflation to increase. Naturally, the central bank’s concern for the
unfavorable change in the private agents’ forecast becomes larger when the cost-push shock
is more persistent. As a result, the central bank is more conservative in setting the optimal
inflation rate. If the shock is as highly persistent as a unit root process, the central bank
commits to an inflation rate which does not depend on the current shock.
In our model, the New Keynesian Phillips curve contains lagged inflation. The lagged
inflation rate is an endogenous state variable and hence the method in Woodford (2010)
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cannot be applied. Using our algorithms, we find the following new results: (i) When the
degree of inflation inertia is larger, the sensitivities to the contemporaneous cost-push shock
of both the robustly optimal commitment and discretionary policies are closer to those un-
der rational expectations. In this case, the impact of the belief distortion from the private
sector is smaller as a smaller weight is attached to the expected inflation. (ii) The robustly
optimal discretionary policy is more sensitive to lagged inflation than the optimal discre-
tionary policy under rational expectations. This sensitivity increases as the volatility of the
cost-push shock increases. This is in contrast to the case of rational expectations under
which the optimal discretionary inflation responds to lagged inflation by the same degree
regardless of the size of the shock volatility. The intuition is that, without commitment,
the inflation bias is larger with concerns for robustness than in the case of rational expec-
tations. Under the worst-case beliefs, inflation expectations are biased upward, and hence
a discretionary central bank has a greater incentive to respond to both the current shock
and lagged inflation.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the general frame-
work. Section 3 presents an algorithm for solving robustly optimal policy in a timeless
perspective. Section 4 provides an algorithm for solving robustly optimal discretionary pol-
icy. Section 5 analyzes a monetary policy example. Section 6 concludes. Technical details
are relegated to appendices.
3.2 A Linear-Quadratic Framework
3.2.1 Uncertainty and Beliefs
Uncertainty is generated by a stochastic process of shocks {εt}∞t=0 where εt is an nε × 1
vector of independently and identically distributed standard normal random variable. Let
εt = {ε0, ε1, ..., εt} . At date t, both the policymaker and the private sector have common
information generated by εt and some initial state x0. They may not have rational ex-
pectations in that their subjective beliefs may not coincide with the objective probability
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distribution governing exogenous shocks {εt}∞t=0. One reason is that economic agents view
their model as an approximation and thus may be concerned about model misspecification.
Model misspecification is described by a perturbation to the distribution of shocks. Let
p (ε) denote the standard normal density of εt. Let P and Pt denote the induced distribution
over the full state space and the induced joint distribution of εt, respectively. Assume that
a distorted distribution is absolutely continuous with respect to the reference distribution
P. We can then represent belief distortions by Radon-Nikodym derivatives.
Let pˆ
(
ε|εt, x0
)
denote an alternative one-step-ahead density for εt+1 conditioned on
date t information. Form the likelihood ratio or the Radon-Nikodym derivative for one-
step-ahead distributions:
mt+1 =
pˆ
(
ε|εt, x0
)
p (ε)
.
It satisfies the property
Et [mt+1] = 1, (3.1)
where Et denotes the conditional expectation operator for the reference distribution P given
date t information. Inspired by Hansen and Sargent (2001, 2008), Woodford (2010) uses
conditional relative entropy to measure the discrepancy between the distorted distribution
and the reference distribution. He first constructs the conditional relative entropy of a one-
step-ahead distribution given date t information as Et [mt+1 lnmt+1]. He then defines the
expected discounted entropy conditioned on date zero information as
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt [Et (mt+1 lnmt+1)] = E0
∞∑
j=0
βtmt+1 lnmt+1. (3.2)
Model ambiguity is described by a set of one-step-ahead densities {mt}∞t=1 satisfying the
constraint:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtmt+1 lnmt+1 ≤ η0 (3.3)
for some η0 > 0.
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3.2.2 Robustly Optimal Policy Problem
Suppose that the equilibrium system from the private sector can be summarized by the
following form:
[
I 0
D21 D22
] [
xt+1
Eˆtyt+1
]
= Aˆ
[
xt
yt
]
+ Bˆut +
[
Ĉx
0
]
εt+1, (3.1)
where x0 is exogenously given and Eˆt denotes the conditional expectation operator given
date t information based on the common beliefs of the private sector. The private sector’s
beliefs may not coincide with the “objective” probability distribution for {εt} , the reference
distribution P. Here xt is an nx × 1 vector of predetermined variables in the sense defined
in Klein (2000), yt is an ny × 1 vector of non-predetermined or forward-looking variables,
and ut is an nu × 1 vector of instrument or control variables chosen by the policymaker.
We typically use xt to represent the state of the economy, which may include productivity
shocks, preference shocks, or capital stock. Note that xt may include a component of
unity in order to handle constants. The vector yt represents endogenous variables such as
consumption, inflation rate, and output. Examples of instruments ut include interest rates
and money growth rates. The equation for xt is backward-looking and represents the law
of motion of state variables. The equation for yt is forward-looking and typically represents
the first-order conditions from intertemporal optimization, such as Euler equations.
All matrices in (3.1) are conformable. For simplicity, we suppose that the matrix on the
left side of equation (3.1) is invertible so that we can multiply both sides of this equation
by its inverse to obtain the system:3
[
xt+1
Eˆtyt+1
]
= A
[
xt
yt
]
+But + Cεt+1, (3.2)
3The singular case can be handled by the QZ decomposition method, e.g., Klein (2000) and Sims (2002).
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where we have used the shorthand notation,
A ≡
[
Axx Axy
Ayx Ayy
]
, B ≡
[
Bx
By
]
, C ≡
[
Cx
0
]
,
and where we have partitioned matrices conformably.
The policymaker has the period loss function,
L (xt, yt, ut) =
1
2
[
x′t, y
′
t
] [ Qxx, Qxy
Q′xy Qyy
] [
xt
yt
]
+
1
2
u′tRut +
[
x′t, y
′
t
] [ Sx
Sy
]
ut,
where we assume the matrix  Qxx Qxy SxQ′xy Qyy Sy
S′x S′y R
 ,
is symmetric and positive semidefinite.
If both the private sector and the policymaker have rational expectations, then they have
common beliefs which coincide with P, the probability distribution governing exogenous
shocks {εt} . In this case, the optimal policy problem with commitment is given by
max
{xt,yt,ut}
− E0
∞∑
t=0
βtL (xt, yt, ut) , (3.3)
subject to (3.2) in which the conditional expectation operator Eˆt is equal to Et, the condi-
tional expectation operator with respect to P.
Following Woodford (2010), we suppose that the policymaker has a single model of the
exogenous processes {εt} and thus no ambiguity along this dimension. Nevertheless, the
policymaker faces ambiguity because it knows only that the private sector’s model is within
a set of probability models surrounding its own model. The policymaker evaluates the
private sector’s forward-looking equation using a worst-case model and solves the following
problem:
max
{xt,yt,ut}
min
{mt+1}
− E0
∞∑
t=0
βtL (xt, yt, ut) + θE0
∞∑
t=0
βtmt+1 lnmt+1, (3.4)
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subject to (4.2) and
[
xt+1
Et [mt+1yt+1]
]
= A
[
xt
yt
]
+But + Cεt+1. (3.5)
Here the parameter θ > 0 penalizes one-step-ahead densities {mt} with large relative en-
tropies defined in (4.6). It may be regarded as the Lagrange multiplier for the constraint
(4.7). Following Hansen and Sargent (2001, 2008), instead of solving for the constraint
problem subject to (4.7), we treat θ as a parameter, which measures the policymaker’s
degree of concern for possible departures from rational expectations, with a small value of
θ implying a great degree of concern for robustness, while a large value of θ implies that
only modest departures from rational expectations are considered plausible. When θ →∞,
the rational expectations analysis is obtained as a limiting case.
3.3 Commitment in a Timeless Perspective
Instead of solving for an optimal commitment policy,4 Woodford (2010) uses a timeless
perspective to derive a closed-form solution to a robustly optimal monetary policy problem
in a simple New Keynesian model. We now extend his idea to our general formulation.
We replace E0 in (3.4) with E−1, the conditional expectation operator given the economy’s
state at date −1, i.e., before the realization of the period zero state x0 or implied ε0. Instead
of supposing that the policymaker chooses a sequence of (possibly time-varying) {yt} for all
t ≥ 0, we consider only the problem of choosing an optimal sequence of commitments {yt}
for periods t ≥ 1, taking as given a commitment y0 that the policymaker must fulfill.
Suppose that the initial commitment takes a linear form:
y0 = Φ−1 + Γ−1ε0,
for some coefficients (Φ−1,Γ−1) . Suppose that {yt} chosen for periods t ≥ 1 may depend on
(Φ−1,Γ−1) and shocks from periods zero through t. We focus on conditionally linear rules
4Kwon and Miao (2012) study this type of policy in models with three types of ambiguity.
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of the following form:
yt+1 = Φt + Γtεt+1, t ≥ 0, (3.6)
where Φt is stochastic and measurable with respect to date t information and Γt is de-
terministic. For any initial commitment (Φ−1,Γ−1) , the policymaker chooses (Φt,Γt)t≥0 ,
{xt,mt}t≥1 , and {ut}t≥0 to solve problem (3.4).
To define optimal policy from a timeless perspective, suppose that Φ−1 is drawn from
some distribution ρ. The initial commitment (Φ−1,Γ−1) is self-consistent if the solution to
the robust Ramsey policy is such that (i) Γt = Γ−1 and (ii) the unconditional distribution
of ρt for Φt is equal to ρ, for each t ≥ 0. Our goal is to solve for a conditionally linear
robustly optimal policy with a self-consistent initial commitment.5
Form the Lagrangian expression:
E−1
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
− L (xt, yt, ut) + θmt+1 lnmt+1 − φt (Etmt+1 − 1)
− [µ′xt+1, µ′yt]([ xt+1Etmt+1yt+1
]
−A
[
xt
yt
]
−But − Cεt+1
)}
,
where βtφt and β
t
[
µ′xt+1, µ′yt
]
are vectors of Lagrange multipliers associated with the con-
straints (4.2) and (3.5), respectively. Note that µxt+1 is measurable with respect to date
t + 1 information and corresponds to xt+1, but µyt is measurable with respect to date t
information and corresponds to yt.
The first-order conditions with respect to mt+1 are given by
θ(1 + lnmt+1)− φt − µ′ytyt+1 = 0. (3.7)
Substituting the linear form in (3.6) into the above equation yields:
lnmt+1 = −1 + θ−1φt + θ−1µ′yt(Φt + Γtt+1). (3.8)
5See Woodford (2003, Chapter 7) for the concept of self-consistency under rational expectations.
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Since Γt, Φt, µyt, φt are measurable with respect to the date t information, mt+1 follows
a log-normal distribution conditioned on date t information. Using equation (4.2), we can
show that the worst-case density is given by
mt+1 = exp
(
−1
2
θ−2µ′ytΓtΓ
′
tµyt + θ
−1µ′ytΓtt+1
)
. (3.9)
This implies that under the worst-case belief, the shock εt follows a normal distribution
with mean θ−1Γ′tµyt and covariance matrix I.
Under the worst-case belief, the conditional expectation of yt+1 is given by
Etmt+1yt+1 = Φt + θ
−1ΓtΓ′tµyt, (3.10)
and the conditional relative entropy is given by
Etmt+1 lnmt+1 =
1
2
θ−2µ′ytΓtΓ
′
tµyt. (3.11)
Since Etyt+1 = Φt, it follows that, relative to the policymaker’s expectations, the worst-case
beliefs distort the private agents’ expectations by θ−1ΓtΓ′tµyt.
Now substitute equations (3.10) and (3.11) into the Lagrangian to obtain
E−1
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
−L(xt,Φt−1 + Γt−1t, ut) + 1
2
θ−1µ′ytΓtΓ
′
tµyt −[
µxt+1
µyt
]′([
xt+1
Φt + θ
−1ΓtΓ′tµyt
]
−A
[
xt
Φt−1 + Γt−1t
]
−But − Cεt+1
)}
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The first-order conditions with respect to xt, ut, Φt, and Γt are given by
6
xt : 0 =−Qxxxt −Qxy (Φt−1 + Γt−1t)− Sxut − β−1µxt
+A′xxEtµxt+1 +A
′
yxµyt, (3.12)
ut : 0 =−Rut − S′xxt − S′y (Φt−1 + Γt−1t) +B′xEtµxt+1 +B′yµyt, (3.13)
Φt : 0 =−
(
Q′xyEtxt+1 +QyyΦt
)− SyEtut+1 − β−1µyt
+ Et
[
A′xyµxt+2 +A
′
yyµyt+1
]
, (3.14)
Γt : 0 =− βQ′xyEtxt+1′t+1 − βQyyEt (Φt + Γtt+1) ′t+1 − βSyEtut+1′t+1
− θ−1µytµ′ytΓt + βEt
[(
A′xyµxt+2 +A
′
yyµyt+1
)
′t+1
]
. (3.15)
Plugging (3.6), (3.10) and (3.11) into (3.5) yields:
0 = xt+1 −Axxxt −Axy (Φt−1 + Γt−1t)−Bxut − Cxt+1, (3.16)
0 = θ−1ΓtΓ′tµyt + Φt −Ayxxt −Ayy (Φt−1 + Γt−1t)−Byut. (3.17)
Since we focus on self-consistent optimal policy, we assume that Γt = Γ for all t. We
start with an initial guess of Γ and then solve for {xt, ut,Φt, µxt, µyt} given this guess.
Equations (3.12), (3.13), (3.14), (3.16), and (3.17), together with two identity equations,
Etεt+1 = 0 and Etµxt+1 = Etµxt+1, form a linear system of the following form:
J

Etεt+1
Etxt+1
Φt
Etut+1
Etµyt+1
Etµxt+1
Etµxt+2

= F

εt
xt
Φt−1
ut
µyt
µxt
Etµxt+1

, (3.18)
6For any scalar function f (X) of a n× k matrix X = (xij), we define the derivative
∂f (X)
∂X
=
 ∂f(X)∂x11 ... ∂f(X)∂x1k...
∂f(X)
∂xn1
... ∂f(X)
∂xnk

n×k
.
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where
J =

I 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 I 0
0 I 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 I 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 A′xx 0
0 0 0 0 0 B′x 0
0 Q′xy Qyy Sy −A′yy 0 −A′xy

,
and
F =

0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 I
AxyΓ Axx Axy Bx 0 0 0
AyyΓ Ayx Ayy By −θ−1ΓΓ′ 0 0
QxyΓ Qxx Qxy Sx −A′yx β−1I 0
S′yΓ S′x S′y R −B′y 0 0
0 0 0 0 −β−1I 0 0

.
Here εt, xt and Φt−1 are predetermined variables, and ut, µyt, µxt and Etµxt+1 are non-
predetermined variables.7 Adapting a standard method for solving linear rational expecta-
tions models (e.g., Klein (2000)), we can show in Appendix A that the solution takes the
following state space representation:8
 εt+1xt+1
Φt
 = M
 εtxt
Φt−1
+
 ICx
0
 εt+1. (3.19)
and 
ut
µyt
µxt
Etµxt+1
 = N
 εtxt
Φt−1
 , (3.20)
where the first row of M contains zero elements.
For Φt to have an invariant distribution, (3.19) should be a stationary process, which
can be satisfied if M has all eigenvalues inside the unit circle. We assume this condition is
satisfied.
After deriving the state space representation, we can derive an updated value for Γ using
7In our solution, the non-predetermined variable yt in the equilibrium system from the private sector is
rewritten using predetermined variables (Φt−1, εt). Thus, the Lagrange multiplier µyt associated with yt
becomes a non-predetermined variable.
8Note that the system in (3.18) does not fit exactly in Klein’s (2000) general form.
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(3.15). When θ is finite, the presence of the term β−1θ−1µytµ′ytΓt in (3.15) implies that the
solution for Γ may be time varying. The timeless perspective discussed in Woodford (2010)
solves this issue. Since the optimal policy in the timeless perspective should satisfy (3.15)
for every realization of the initial commitment, Φ−1, we can take unconditional expectations
on both sides of (3.15) to derive 9
Γ = β
(
θ−1E
[
µytµ
′
yt
]
+ βQyy
)−1
×{E [(A′xyµxt+2 +A′yyµyt+1) ′t+1]−Q′xyCx − SyE [ut′t]} , (3.21)
where we have assumed that the inverse exists. In Appendix B, we derive formulas for
computing unconditional moments E
[
µytµ
′
yt
]
, E
[
µxt+2
′
t+1
]
, E
[
µyt+1
′
t+1
]
, and E [ut
′
t].
The above equation gives an updated solution for Γ denoted by Γˆ. If Γˆ is sufficiently close
to Γ, stop. Otherwise, use Γˆ to replace Γ and repeat the above procedure until convergence.
We are unable to give a condition to guarantee convergence. But this algorithm works well
for all examples studied in this paper.
From the above analysis, we find that the robustness parameter θ appears explicitly in
two terms only: one is −θ−1ΓΓ′ in the matrix F and the other is θ−1E [µytµ′yt] in equation
(3.21). In the limit as θ →∞, both terms vanish and the solution converges to the rational
expectations case. When θ is smaller, the impact of robustness is larger. In addition, the
impact of robustness on Γ depends on the moment E
[
µytµ
′
yt
]
for any fixed finite value of
θ. These observations are important for understanding the intuition behind the examples
analyzed later.
3.4 Robust Discretionary Policy
To understand the value and importance of policy commitment, we now study robust discre-
tionary policy. In this case, the policymaker reoptimizes every period by taking the private
agents’ expectations about future policy as given. We shall focus on Markov perfect equi-
9Note that taking unconditional expectations on other first-order conditions, i.e. (3.12)∼(3.14), does not
add additional information to the solution.
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librium (MPE). A robust MPE consists of time-invariant functions f (xt) and V (xt) such
that given yt+1 = f (xt+1) , V (xt) and yt = f (xt) solve the following Bellman equation:
V (xt) = max
yt,ut
min
mt+1
− L (xt, yt, ut) + βEtV (xt+1) + θEtmt+1 lnmt+1, (3.22)
subject to (4.2) and (3.5).
We focus on linear solutions for f in that
yt = Gxt, for all t, (3.23)
for some matrix G to be determined. Adapting the method from the rational expectations
analysis (e.g., Backus and Driffil (1986) and Soderlind (1999)), we use an iterative procedure
to find G by backward induction. Specifically, let
yt+1 = Gt+1xt+1, (3.24)
where Gt+1 is a deterministic matrix. Substituting this expression into the forward-looking
equation in (3.5) and rewrite the Bellman equation (3.22) as
Vt (xt) = max
yt,ut
min
mt+1
− L (xt, yt, ut) + βEtVt+1 (xt+1) + θEtmt+1 lnmt+1. (3.25)
We can show that the first-order condition with respect to mt+1 is given by (3.7),
where φt and µyt are the Lagrange multipliers associated with (4.2) and the forward-looking
equation in (3.5), respectively. Using equations (4.2), (3.5), (3.7), (3.23) we can show that
mt+1 = exp
(
−1
2
θ−2µ′ytGt+1CxC
′
xG
′
t+1µyt + θ
−1µ′ytGt+1Cxt+1
)
.
It follows that mt+1 follows a log-normal distribution conditioned on date t information.
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We can then compute
Etmt+1 lnmt+1 =
1
2
θ−1µ′ytΛt+1µyt, (3.26)
Etmt+1yt+1 = Gt+1 (Axxxt +Axyyt +Bxut) + Λt+1µyt, (3.27)
where we define Λt+1 ≡ θ−1Gt+1CxC ′xG′t+1. Since Etyt+1 = Gt+1 (Axxxt +Axyyt +Bxut) ,
the worst-case beliefs distort the private agents’ expectations by Λt+1µyt, relative to the
policymaker’s expectations.
Substituting (3.27) into (3.5) yields:
Gt+1 (Axxxt +Axyyt +Bxut) + Λt+1µyt = Ayxxt +Ayyyt +Byut. (3.28)
Conjecture that
Vt (xt) = −1
2
x′tJtxt −
1
2
vt,
where Jt is a deterministic matrix and vt is a deterministic constant. Substituting the
conjecture and (3.26) into the Bellman equation (3.25) yields:
−1
2
x′tJtxt −
1
2
vt = max
yt,ut
− 1
2
x′tQxxxt −
1
2
y′tQyyyt − x′tQxyyt (3.29)
−1
2
u′tRut − x′tSxut − y′tSyut
+
1
2
µ′ytΛt+1µyt + βEt
(
−1
2
x′t+1Jt+1xt+1 −
1
2
vt+1
)
,
subject to (3.28) and
xt+1 = Axxxt +Axyyt +Bxut + Cxεt+1,
where the Lagrange multiplier µyt is associated with (3.28). The above problem is a standard
linear quadratic control problem with state variable xt and control variables ut and yt. In
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Appendix C, we solve for Jt, vt and linear decision rules of the following form:
ut = −Ftxt, yt = Gtxt.
To find the time-invariant functions, we start with an initial guess of a positive semi-
definite matrix Jt+1, a constant vt+1, and any matrix Gt+1. We then obtain the updated
constant vt and matrices Jt and Gt. Iterating this process until convergence gives J and G
in a Markov perfect equilibrium. In addition, vt converges to v in the value function and
Ft converges to F , which gives the stationary policy rule. Note that since a MPE is a fixed
point, there may be multiple equilibria or no equilibrium. For the simple New Keynesian
model, Woodford (2010) provides explicit characterizations. But a similar characterization
for our general model is not available.
3.5 Applications to Monetary Policy
In this section, we apply our general theory to the study of robustly optimal monetary
policy in a New Keynesian model. The central bank’s loss function is given by
E−1
∞∑
t=0
βt
1
2
[
pi2t + λ(xt − x∗)2
]
, (3.30)
where pit denotes the inflation rate, xt denotes the output gap, and x
∗ ≥ 0 denotes the
target output gap. The value of x∗ measures the degree of inefficiency of the steady state.
If x∗ = 0, the steady state is efficient. The parameter λ measures the weight to the output
gap.
Empirical studies find evidence that inflation is persistent (e.g., Fuhrer (1996)). Thus,
suppose that the New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC) is given by
pit = κxt + ηpit−1 + β(1− η)Etmt+1pit+1 + zt, (3.31)
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where η ∈ (0, 1) measures the degree of backward-looking behavior exhibited by inflation.10
Assume that κ > 0 and {zt} follows an AR(1) process:
zt = ρzzt−1 + σzεt, εt ∼ N (0, 1), (3.32)
where ρz ∈ (0, 1) and σz > 0. When η = 0, the model reduces to the basic New Keynesian
model studied by Woodford (2010). When η ∈ (0, 1), Woodford’s (2010) analytical method
does not apply because the lagged inflation rate provides another state variable.
3.5.1 Timeless Perspective Commitment
The robustly optimal policy problem with commitment is given by
max
{xt,pit}
min
{mt+1}
−E−1
∞∑
t=0
βt
1
2
[
pi2t + λ(xt − x∗)2
]
+ θE−1
∞∑
t=0
βtmt+1 lnmt+1 (3.1)
subject to (3.31). To solve this problem using our general framework, we define a new
predetermined state variable as kt+1 ≡ pit and rewrite (3.31) as
kt+1 = pit, (3.2)
Etmt+1pit+1 = β
−1(1− η)−1 (−ηkt + pit − κxt − zt) . (3.3)
To map this problem into our general framework, we note that kt and zt constitute the
predetermined vector xt, pit is the forward-looking variable yt, and xt is the control variable
ut. Assume that the central bank commits to a policy in the form
pit+1 = Φt + Γεt+1. (3.4)
10See, e.g, Gali and Gertler (1999) for a microfounded model with this feature.
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Let µpit denote the Lagrange multiplier associated with (3.3). As in Section 3, we can show
that the worst-case belief satisfies
Etmt+1pit+1 = Φt + θ
−1Γ2µpit. (3.5)
Since Etpit+1 = Φt, θ
−1Γ2µpit represents the distortion of the private agents’ expectations
relative to the central bank’s. We can then use our algorithm developed in Section 3 to
solve for a robustly optimal policy with timeless perspective commitment.
We set baseline parameter values for β, κ, λ, and x∗ as in Woodford (2010): β = 0.99,
κ = 0.2, λ = 0.08, x∗ = 0.05.11 We first set η = 0 in the top four panels of Figure 3·1.
In particular, the first panel replicates the result in Woodford (2010) when ρz = 0. We
confirm his result that when the central bank is more concerned for robustness, it is more
conservative and inflation responds less to the cost-push shock in the sense that Γ decreases
with 1/θ. In addition, Γ decreases more than proportionally with σz. This implies that
certainty-equivalence does not apply to the robustly optimal case. Notably, Γ decreases
with σz for large values of σz when ρz is sufficiently large. When the cost-push shock is
sufficiently persistent as much as ρz = 0.95, robustly optimal Γ is almost independent of σz,
as illustrated in the second panel of Figure 3·1. The middle two panels of this figure shows
the impact of ρz for σz = 0.02 and 0.04. Under rational expectations, Γ is an increasing
function of ρz, which can be easily verified analytically. When robustness matters, however,
this relation does not apply. For low values of σz, e.g., σz = 0.02, Γ first increases with ρz
and then decreases to zero. If the concern for robustness is very high, e.g., θ = 0.001, Γ
decreases with ρz for high σz, e.g., σz = 0.04. In the limiting case, Γ = 0 if the cost-push
shock process is a unit root process (i.e., ρz = 1) for all θ <∞.
As Woodford (2010) points out, the central bank is not willing to let inflation increase
in response to a positive cost-push shock when it is faced with a concern for robustness.
The central bank fears that a large shock in inflation might affect the private agents’ in-
11There is a typo in Woodford (2010). Parameter values of κ and x∗ in his paper should be interchanged
to replicate the figures in his paper.
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Figure 3·1: Variation of Γ with σz, ρz, and η for alternative values of θ.
For the top four panels, we set η = 0. For the bottom two panels, we set
ρz = 0.
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flation expectations unfavorably to the central bank and thus the output-inflation trade-off
might worsen if it allows inflation to increase. Naturally, the central bank’s concern for
the unfavorable change in the agent’s forecast becomes larger when the cost-push shock is
more persistent. As a result, the central bank is more conservative in setting the optimal
inflation rate. If the shock is as highly persistent as a unit root process, the central bank
commits to an inflation rate which does not depend on the current shock.
The bottom two panels of Figure 3·1 show the impact of inflation persistence η. For
simplicity, we assume that the cost-push shock does not exhibit persistence, i.e., ρz = 0.
In the rational expectations case (i.e., θ = ∞), Γ increases with η until η = 0.5, then
decreases. The shape of Γ shows a symmetry around η = 0.5. As the degree of concern for
robustness increases, i.e., θ decreases, Γ also decreases for a fixed η. The degree of decrease
in Γ is larger when η is smaller. This is because the impact of the concern for robustness
increases when the weight on the inflation expectation is larger (i.e., η is smaller) in the
New Keynesian Phillips curve. In the limiting case when η = 1, inflation is completely
determined one period ahead so that the central bank’s doubt about the private sector’s
expectations does not change the optimal policy for inflation. Accordingly, the shape of Γ is
no longer symmetric. Also note that for a given value of η the optimal value of Γ decreases
more as σz increases.
Figure 3·2 presents the dynamics of inflation, the worst-case inflation expectation, out-
put gap, and prices in response to a purely temporary one-standard-deviation cost-push
shock. For a moderate degree of inflation inertia (η = 0.3), the impulse responses exhibit
very similar dynamics for both the rational expectations equilibrium and the robustly op-
timal equilibrium. The intuition is that the impact of the belief distortion from the private
sector is small since a weight of 0.7 is attached to the expected inflation. We also find
that the long-run inflation rate is small but positive for both the rational expectations and
robustness cases. The intuition is that in the presence of inflation inertia, the change in
current inflation does not move future expected inflation one for one as it is attached a
weight less than one. The central bank has an incentive to increase inflation to raise the
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Figure 3·2: Impulse responses to a purely temporary positive cost-push
shock with η = 0.3 and σz = 0.02. The inflation expectation is with respect
to the worst-case beliefs of the private agents.
output gap given x∗ > 0. The robustly optimal long-run output gap is still negative, which
follows from the fact the long-run worst-case inflation expectations of the private agents are
positive, worsening the inflation-output tradeoff.
We emphasize that the impact of robustness also depends on the efficiency of the steady
state, as reflected by the value of x∗. This is because the Lagrange multiplier µpit associated
with NKPC (3.31) increases with x∗ by the following first-order condition with respect to
xt,
β−1(1− η)−1κµpit = −λ(xt − x∗).
As revealed by Figure 3·2, this result has two consequences. First, x∗ biases the inflation
expectation upward by (3.5). Thus, the steady-state output gap is negative even though
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the steady-state inflation rate is zero. Second, E
[
µ2pit
]
also increases with x∗. As we have
discussed in the end of Section 3, this implies that Γ decreases with x∗ for a finite θ (see
(3.21)). Thus, under robustly optimal monetary policy the central bank will be more
conservative in raising inflation in response to a positive cost-push shock when the economy
is more inefficient. This result is in sharp contrast to that in the rational expectations case.
Under rational expectations, the level of x∗ does not affect Γ. It only affects the steady-state
inflation.
3.5.2 Discretion
We define zt and kt = pit−1 as the state variables and use the algorithm described in Section
4 to solve for a linear MPE of the form:
pit = G0 +Gpipit−1 +Gzzt, (3.1)
where G0, Gpi, and Gz are constants to be determined. The coefficients Gpi and Gz measure
the sensitivities of inflation to pit−1 and zt , respectively. We can rewrite (3.1) as
pit = G0 +Gpipit−1 + ρzGzzt−1 + G¯εt,
where G¯ ≡ σzGz, which is the sensitivity of inflation to a shock εt and corresponds to Γ
under commitment.
As we showed earlier, the inflation inertia in the New Keynesian Phillips curve reduces
the effect of inflation expectations and hence the effect of a concern for robustness on the
optimal policy under commitment. This fact also applies to the discretionary policy with
a concern for robustness. Figure 3·3 shows the optimal responses of inflation (i.e., Γ and
G¯) to a cost-push shock under commitment and under discretion for different values of σz,
respectively, and the effects of η and ρz. For a purely temporary shock without inflation
persistence (i.e., ρz = 0 and η = 0), we confirm Woodford’s (2010) result that robustly
optimal inflation under discretion is more responsive to the cost-push shock than in the
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Figure 3·3: Variation of G¯ and Γ with σz for different values of ρz and
η, under discretionary policy and under an optimal commitment, with and
without a concern for robustness (θ =∞ and θ = 0.001).
rational expectations case. When the cost-push shock becomes more persistent, e.g., ρz is
increased to 0.5, the robustly optimal inflation under discretion is more responsive to the
cost-push shock for a given value of σz. But the range of σz for the existence of a robust
MPE shrinks.
Turn to the impact of inflation persistence. For ρz = 0, when the degree of inflation
inertia is increased from η = 0 to η = 0.5, the robustly optimal inflation under discretion is
less responsive to the cost-push shock for a given value of σz. In addition, the range of σz
for the existence of a robust MPE expands. Thus, the net effects of the shock persistence
and inflation persistence are ambiguous. Comparing the bottom two panels of Figure 3·3,
we find that given η = 0.5, when ρz is increased from 0 to 0.5, the robustly optimal inflation
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Figure 3·4: Variation of senstitvity of inflation to lagged inflation (Gpi)
with σz
under discretion becomes more responsive to the cost-push shock for small values of σz, but
it is less responsive for high values of σz.
Figure 3·4 exhibits how a discretionary policy responds to lagged inflation for different
values of σz. When the central bank has a doubt about its knowledge of the inflation
expectations of the private sector, the optimal discretionary policy is more sensitive to
lagged inflation than under rational expectations. The sensitivity increases as the volatility
σz of the cost-push shock increases. This is in contrast to the case of rational expectations
under which optimal inflation responds to lagged inflation by the same degree regardless of
the size of σz. Furthermore, as the central bank is more concerned about robustness (i.e., θ
is smaller), the sensitivity to the lagged inflation of a discretionary policy becomes larger.
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But the range of σz for the existence of a robust MPE is smaller.
Figure 3·4 also reveals that for fixed ρz, when inflation peristence is larger (e.g., η is
increased from 0.3 to 0.5), the robustly optimal inflation under discretion is more responsive
to lagged inflation. For fixed η, when the cost-push shock is more persistent (e.g., ρz
is increased from 0 to 0.5), the robustly optimal inflation under discretion is also more
responsive to lagged inflation.
The intuition behind the above results is that, without commitment, the inflation bias
is larger in the case of concerns for robustness than in the case of rational expectations.
Under the worst-case beliefs, inflation expectations are biased upward, and hence a dis-
cretionary central bank has a greater incentive to respond to both the current shock and
lagged inflation than under rational expectations. This effect is stronger if the cost-push
shock is more persistent. However, this effect is weaker if a smaller weight is put on the
inflation expectations.
Figure 3·5 shows the impulse responses of inflation, the worst-case inflation expectation,
output gap, and prices to a positive cost-push shock under discretion. To compare with the
commitment solution, we also plot impulse responses under commitment. When the central
bank has a concern for robustness, the steady-state level of inflation under discretion is
higher than that under rational expectations. But the steady-state level of the output gap
under discretion is still below the one with commitment. With commitment, however, the
steady-state level of inflation is not affected by a concern for robustness. This is because
under robust MPE, the central bank needs to keep inflation rate higher since otherwise
output would be lowered even further due to the distorted belief of private agents. But the
central bank cannot allow too much inflation to increase output for fear of the possibility
that inflation expectation would become so high that the output gap might actually decline
further.
We emphasize that with discretionary monetary policy under robustness, the inflation
expectation is distorted more than with commitment. With commitment, the central bank
actively manages the beliefs of private agents and reduces the distortion in private beliefs;
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Figure 3·5: Impulse responses to a purely temporary positive cost-push
shock with η = 0.3 and σz = 0.02 under commitment and discretion. With
concern for robustness, θ = 0.001.
hence the output gap. By contrast, the central bank with discretionary monetary policy
cannot manage expectations of the private sector effectively, and thus both the inflation
expectation and the output gap worsen.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented algorithms for solving robust policy problems in a general
linear-quadratic framework by extending the Woodford (2010) approach. We have applied
our algorithms to a New Keynesian model. Our algorithms are based on a linear-quadratic
framework, which has been applied widely for policy analysis. One may wonder whether this
framework can be justified by a microfounded model. This question does not seem obvious
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with concerns for robustness, though this issue is well understood under rational expecta-
tions (e.g., Woodford (2003)). Adam and Woodford (2012) present a fully microfounded
model and show that the linear-quadratic model of Woodford (2010) can be microfounded.
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Appendix
3.A State Space Representation of the Solution
We adapt Klein’s (2000) method to derive the solution in (3.19) and (3.20). His method
cannot be directly applied since the system in (3.18) does not fit in his general form. Apply
a QZ decomposition to matrices J and F. There exist square complex matrices Q, S, T
and Z such that
J = QSZH , F = QTZH ,
where ZH denotes the transpose of the complex conjugate of Z. Q and Z are unitary (i.e.,
QHQ = ZHZ = I), and S and T are upper triangular (see Golub and van Loan (1996)). The
decomposition can be reordered so that the block corresponding to the stable generalized
eigenvalues (the ith diagonal element of T divided by the corresponding element in S) comes
first. Define auxiliary variables
[
kt
λt
]
= ZH

εt
xt
Φt−1
ut
µyt
µxt
Etµxt+1

, (3.A.1)
where kt corresponds to the predetermined variables εt, xt and Φt−1, and λt corresponds
to the non-predetermined variables ut, µyt, µxt, and Etµxt+1. Premultiplying (3.18) by Q
H ,
using (3.A.1), and partitioning S and T conformably, we can derive
[
Skk Skλ
0 Sλλ
]
Et
[
kt+1
λt+1
]
=
[
Tkk Tkλ
0 Tλλ
] [
kt
λt
]
. (3.A.2)
We solve for a stable solution to the above system, which requires that the number of stable
generalized eigenvalues be equal to the number of predetermined variables. We rule out the
case of generalized eigenvalues with unitary modulus. Thus, the lower right block contains
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the unstable generalized eigenvalues. It follows that λt = 0 for all t. We can then write
remaining equations in the above system as
Etkt+1 = S
−1
kk Tkkkt, (3.A.3)
where Skk is invertible by our ordering of the matrix S.
Premultiplying both sides of (3.A.1) by Z yields:

εt
xt
Φt−1
ut
µyt
µxt
Etµxt+1

= Z
[
kt
λt
]
=
[
Zkk Zkλ
Zλk Zλλ
] [
kt
λt
]
=
[
Zkk
Zλk
]
kt, (3.A.4)
where we have used the fact that λt = 0. Suppose that Zkk is invertible. It follows that
kt = Z
−1
kk
 εtxt
Φt−1
 . (3.A.5)
Substituting the above equation into (3.A.3) yields:
Z−1kk Et
 εt+1xt+1
Φt
 = S−1kk TkkZ−1kk
 εtxt
Φt−1
 .
Premultiplying by Zkk and using the law of iterated expectations, we obtain
 Etεt+1Etxt+1
Φt
 = ZkkS−1kk TkkZ−1kk
 εtxt
Φt−1
 .
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Using equations (3.A.4) and (3.A.5) yields:

ut
µyt
µxt
Etµxt+1
 = Zλkkt = ZλkZ−1kk
 εtxt
Φt−1
 .
Using (3.2), we then obtain the solution in the form of (3.19) and (3.20).
3.B Computing Unconditional Moments
After we derive the state space representation of the solution, we can compute unconditional
moments of interest. First, define an auxiliary variable Xt ≡
[
ε′t x′t Φ′t−1
]′
. Then it
follows from (3.19) that
E
[
Xt+1X
′
t+1
]
= ME
[
XtX
′
t
]
M ′ +
 I C ′x 0Cx CxC ′x 0
0 0 0

This is a Lyapunov equation which determines the unconditional second moments of prede-
termined variables. This equation can be solved if predetermined variables are stationary
processes, i.e. all the eigenvalues of M are inside the unit circle, which is assumed to be
true under a timeless perspective.
Next, we use (3.20) to derive that
µyt = N21εt +N22xt +N23Φt−1 = N2Xt,
where N2 ≡
[
N21 N22 N23
]
is the second row of N. We can compute that
E
[
µytµ
′
yt
]
= N2E
[
XtX
′
t
]
N ′2.
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Finally, we use (3.20) to compute the unconditional moments:
E

ut+1ε
′
t+1
µyt+1ε
′
t+1
µxt+1ε
′
t+1
Et+1µxt+2ε
′
t+1
 = NE
εt+1ε′t+1xt+1ε′t+1
Φtε
′
t+1
 = N
 ICx
0
 .
We then obtain the moments E
[
µytµ
′
yt
]
, E
[
µxt+2ε
′
t+1
]
, E
[
µyt+1ε
′
t+1
]
, and E [utε
′
t] .
3.C Computing Discretionary Policy
Substituting xt+1 = Axxxt+Axyyt+Bxut+Cxεt+1 into the value function for xt+1 in (3.29)
and deriving first-order conditions, we obtain
yt : 0 =−Qyyyt −Q′xyxt − Syut + (Ayy −Gt+1Axy)′ µyt
− βA′xyJt+1 (Axxxt +Axyyt +Bxut) , (3.C.1)
ut : 0 =−Rut − S′xxt − S′yyt + (By −Gt+1Bx)′ µyt
− βB′xJt+1 (Axxxt +Axyyt +Bxut) . (3.C.2)
Define the matrix Bˆt+1 ≡ (Ayy −Gt+1Axy)′ and assume that it is invertible. Solving
(3.C.1) for µyt, we can obtain
µyt = At+1xt + Bt+1yt + Ct+1ut, (3.C.3)
where
At+1 ≡ Bˆ−1t+1
(
Q′xy + βA
′
xyJt+1Axx
)
,
Bt+1 ≡ Bˆ−1t+1
(
Qyy + βA
′
xyJt+1Axy
)
,
Ct+1 ≡ Bˆ−1t+1
(
Sy + βA
′
xyJt+1Bx
)
.
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Substituting (3.C.3) into (3.C.2) and solving for ut will yield
ut = A
∗
t+1xt + B
∗
t+1yt, (3.C.4)
where
A∗t+1 ≡ −D−1t+1
[
S′x − (By −Gt+1Bx)′At+1 + βB′xJt+1Axx
]
,
B∗t+1 ≡ −D−1t+1
[
S′y − (By −Gt+1Bx)′Bt+1 + βB′xJt+1Axy
]
.
Note that we have defined
Dt+1 ≡ R− (By −Gt+1Bx)′Ct+1 + βB′xJt+1Bx,
and assumed that it is invertible.
Substituting (3.C.4) into (3.C.3), we obtain
µyt = At+1xt + Bt+1yt, (3.C.5)
where
At+1 ≡ At+1 + Ct+1A∗t+1,
Bt+1 ≡ Bt+1 + Ct+1B∗t+1
After plugging (3.C.4) and (3.C.5) into (3.28) and solving for yt, we can derive the policy
rule for period t as yt = Gtxt, where
Gt ≡ −∆−1t+1
[
Gt+1
(
Axx +BxA
∗
t+1
)
+ Λt+1At+1 −Ayx −ByA∗t+1
]
,
∆t+1 ≡ Gt+1
(
Axy +BxB
∗
t+1
)
+ Λt+1Bt+1 −Ayy −ByB∗t+1.
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We also have to assume that ∆t+1 is invertible. Substituting yt = Gtxt into (3.C.4) yields:
ut = −Ftxt, (3.C.6)
where
Ft ≡ −A∗t+1 −B∗t+1Gt.
Applying the envelop theorem to (3.29) yields:
−Jtxt = −Qxxxt −Qxyyt − Sxut + Aˆt+1µt − βA′xxJt+1 (Axxxt +Axyyt +Bxut) .
Substituting yt = Gtxt, (3.C.5), and (3.C.6) for yt, µyt and ut into the above equation, we
can show that
Jt = Qxx +QxyGt − SxFt − Aˆt+1 (At+1 + Bt+1Gt)
+βA′xxJt+1 (Axx +AxyGt −BxFt) .
Matching constant terms in (3.29) yields:
vt = β
(
tr
(
C ′xJt+1Cx
)
+ vt+1
)
.
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Chapter 4
Robust Optimal Monetary Policy under Belief
Ambiguity
Abstract
This essay documents the impact of belief ambiguity by changing the relative degree of
concern for ambiguity associated with two different shocks: cost-push shocks and the natural
rate of interest shocks. The main results are: i) belief ambiguity relating to cost-push shocks
matters to a central bank much more than belief ambiguity associated with the natural rate
of interest shocks; ii) in some cases, after a positive cost-push shock robust optimal monetary
policy allows initial inflation higher than under rational expectations; iii) robust optimal
monetary policy is not symmetrical in terms of its response to different signs of a shock.
4.1 Introduction
The main advantage of policy with advance commitments comes from the fact that com-
mitment helps the public understand the policy better and thus the degree to which policy
decisions affect their expectations increases. The literature on optimal monetary policy has
shown that, under the rational expectations hypothesis, a central bank can easily shape
expectations of the private sector precisely the way it considers optimal. The hypothesis
of rational expectations1 is, however, a very strong assumption considering the enormous
difficulty of achieving a coincidence of expectations among different agents in each period.
1Under the rational expectations hypothesis the private sector and policy-makers share the same beliefs
and thus there is no doubt or ambiguity relating to other agents’ expectations.
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At the same time, when a central bank does not have a full knowledge on the private sectors’
beliefs the management of expectations becomes considerably difficult. In this context, it is
not surprising the need for managing expectations for future policy decisions has been even
more highly emphasized since the onset of the financial crisis in 2008, mainly because there
were worries that the economy faced considerable uncertainty about economic conditions
and also future policy decisions.
This paper studies how optimal monetary policy rules change in order to manage expec-
tations of the private sector when a central bank has concern for belief ambiguity, using a
simple New Keynesian model in a linear quadratic framework. I assume that a central bank
suffers from a lack of a full knowledge on the private sector’s beliefs and tries to manage
expectations of the private sector to maximize its objective function by making policy com-
mitment, as in Woodford (2010) and Kwon and Miao (2013). In this framework, a central
bank evaluates its policies with respect to pessimistically distorted beliefs of the private
sector, which is specified by the minmax utility.2 As Woodford (2010) points out, however,
even in this case a policymaker can assume that private sector expectations should not be
too different from its own prediction3 since people’s expectations will be shaped largely
by the policy commitment. To prevent the private sector’s beliefs from being unduly pes-
simistically distorted, the total amount of expected measure of belief ambiguity, which is
called the relative entropy, is assumed to be bounded.
In this paper, I assume that a central bank completely trusts its knowledge on the
exogenous shock process but it suffers from a lack of knowledge on the private sector’s
expectations. Generally central banks collect a large amount of data and thus know pretty
well how shocks evolve but still do not have a detailed information on individual beliefs.
Thus one interpretation is that a central bank has a relatively more knowledge on exogenous
shocks than on the private sector’s beliefs.
What is new in this paper is that I allow a central bank to have different levels of concern
2See Hansen and Sargent (2008) for the rationale behind using the minmax utility for policy evaluation.
3Woodford (2010) expresses that people are assumed to have near-rational expectations (NRE) in this
case.
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for belief ambiguity about how the private sector forms expectations for different shocks.
In an extreme case, for example, a central bank is assumed to have a full knowledge on the
private sector’s belief relating to one source of shock, while it suffers from belief ambiguity
associated with other shocks. It is not only conceivable that a central bank holds better
knowledge on the expectations of the private sector about one source of shock than on
other shocks; e.g. in this paper a central bank might have two different levels of concern for
ambiguity relating to the private sector’s beliefs on a cost-push shock and the natural rate
of interest shock. But also, in this way, one can answer some interesting questions: How
do different levels of concern for ambiguity affect monetary policy decisions?; What is more
influential source of ambiguity on policy making? Overall, the main focus of this paper is
to investigate impacts of belief ambiguity on optimal monetary policy, in particular, the
interaction between different sources of belief ambiguity on optimal monetary policy with
commitment.
One main result is that belief ambiguity relating to cost-push shocks matters to a central
bank much more than belief ambiguity associated with the natural rate of interest shocks.
I find that when a central bank faces belief ambiguity, changes in optimal policy mostly
comes from ambiguity relating to a cost-push shock, while belief ambiguity associated with
the natural rate of interest has a relatively small impact on monetary policy decisions.
Intuitively, a cost-push shock involves a significant tradeoff to a central bank. Thus it
worries that the private sector’s expectations on a cost-push shock might be distorted in the
worst-case so that robust policy should be adjusted in order to guide the private sector’s
expectations. On the other hand, the natural rate of interest shock does not lead to a
meaningful tradeoff and thus a central bank fears less about a distortion in belief relating
to it.
I also find it possible that a central bank conducts the monetary policy in a way that
inflation increases more than under rational expectations after a positive cost-push shock.
This finding is meaningful since both Woodford (2010) and Kwon and Miao (2013) show that
in the presence of belief ambiguity a central bank actively stabilizes inflation by committing
87
to an inflation policy which is less responsive to a new innovation. In this paper, I show,
for some reasonable model calibration, a robust optimal policy implies that a central bank
allows higher inflation in order not to sacrifice too much output.
Finally I show that robust optimal monetary policy is not symmetrical in terms of its
response to different signs of a shock. Since a solution to a linear quadratic problem under
rational expectations is given in a linear form, impulse responses are always symmetrical.
Robust optimal policy, however, is not necessarily symmetrical even if I only focus on a
linear class of commitment rules.
The closest paper to this work is Woodford (2010), which studies an optimal monetary
policy problem where a policymaker fully trusts its model but has concern for ambiguity on
the private sector’s beliefs. In Woodford (2010), there is only one exogenous shock, a cost-
push shock, and thus a policymaker worries about belief ambiguity only associated with
inflation. In this paper, I introduce different relative degrees of concern for ambiguity and
analyze their impact on optimal monetary policy. The solution algorithm follows Chapter
3 in this dissertation.
Hansen and Sargent (2012) study a robust Ramsey problem under three types of ambi-
guity in a continuous time framework. Among the three types, the ambiguity in this paper
is closely related to the type III, in which the policymaker has a single model of the exoge-
nous processes but faces ambiguity because of a lack of knowledge on the private sector’s
model. Kwon and Miao (2014) also studies three types of a robust Ramsey problem in
a general linear-quadratic discrete time framework. By focusing a linear robustly optimal
policy in a timeless perspective, this paper takes a different approach from these works.
Most obviously,
Adam and Woodford (2012) analyzed a robustly optimal monetary policy problem with
a micro-founded model. Benigno and Paciello (2011) analyze how model ambiguity in
the dimension of the private sector affects the characterization of optimal monetary by
distinguishing the types of a policymaker into a paternalistic and a benevolent one. Also
there are several other papers that characterize robustly optimal monetary policy in a
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basic New-Keynesian model when the policymaker suffers from model ambiguity including
Giannoni (2002), Dennis (2008), and Leitemo and So¨derlind (2008) to name a few.
This paper is also closely related to the optimal monetary policy literature. The baseline
model in this paper follows Woodford (2003), where a central bank has the interest smooth-
ing feature in its loss function. The standard characteristics of optimal monetary policy
commitment are well documented in Woodford (2003) and Gal´ı (2008), among others.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a basic model for robust optimal
monetary policy problem with different levels of concern for ambiguity. Section 3 then
characterizes the robust optimal policy commitment quantitatively and studies impacts of
belief ambiguity on policy rules. Section 4 presents some conclusions and suggestions for
further work.
4.2 Model
4.2.1 The Objective of the Central Bank
As a baseline model for the optimal monetary policy, I shall assume a central bank aims
to maximize its objective function (or minimize its loss function) which involves quadratic
terms of inflation, output gap, and nominal interest rate following Woodford (2003). This
form of objective function can be derived either from a second-order approximation to the
utility function of the household with non-negligible monetary frictions or from a behavioral
assumption of interest-rate smoothing. The instantaneous objective function in period t is
given by
L (pit, xt, it) = −1
2
[
pi2t + λx(xt − x∗)2 + λii2t
]
, (4.1)
where pit and xt denote a measure of inflation rate and the output gap respectively, and
x∗ ≥ 0 is the target output gap of the central bank. it is the deviation of the short-term
nominal interest rate from its steady-state value, which is possibly the central bank’s policy
instrument. Parameters λx and λi measure the weight to the output gap stabilization and
interest-rate smoothing respectively.
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The objective of the central bank is to maximize the expected value of Lt with a discount
factor 0 < β < 1 subject to two key constraints: an aggregate supply equation, which is
referred to as the New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC) in the literature, given by
pit = βEˆtpit+1 + κxt + zt. (4.2)
and an intertemporal IS equation (or the Euler equation of the representative household)
given by
xt = Eˆtxt+1 − η
(
it − Eˆtpit+1 − rnt
)
, (4.3)
where Eˆt [·] means a conditional expectation of the private sector given information up to
period t, which is not necessarily identical to but at the same time not very different from
the expectation of the central bank. The specific form of the private sector’s expectation
will be given later. I assume that the central bank and the private sector share the same
discount factor β. The structural parameters κ and η are both positive. And finally, zt and
rnt denote the cost-push shock and the natural rate of interest. I assume that both zt and
rnt are exogenous and follow an AR(1) process
zt = ρzzt−1 + σzε1t, (4.4)
rnt = ρrr
n
t−1 + σrε2t, (4.5)
where εit ∼ iid N (0, 1), i ∈ {1, 2} and ε1t and ε2t are independent.
4.2.2 Concern for Belief Ambiguity
Now let’s turn to the problem of ambiguity about the private sector’s expectations. Fol-
lowing Hansen and Sargent (2005), Woodford (2010), and Kwon and Miao (2013), beliefs
of the private sector can be described by a perturbation to the distribution of exogenous
shocks which the central bank considers true. Under the near-rationality assumption fol-
lowing Woodford (2010), I assume that the distribution of the private sector’s beliefs is
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absolutely continuous with respect to the distribution of the central bank’s beliefs. Then,
by Radon-Nikodym derivatives, one can represent the belief of the private sector for any
random variable yt+1 as
Eˆt [yt+1] = Et [mt+1yt+1] , (4.1)
where
mt+1 =
Pˆ (εt+1|εt, S0)
P (εt+1|εt, S0) ,
where P (εt+1|εt, S0) denotes the probability distribution of the central bank over εt+1
conditional on information up to time t and an initial condition S0 and Pˆ
(
εt+1|εt, X0
)
denotes the probability distribution of the private sector. The one-step-ahead likelihood
ratio or the Radon-Nikodym derivative, mt+1, can be thought as a distortion factor to the
private sector’s beliefs with respect to the central bank’s beliefs. Technically, mt+1 satisfies
the property
Et [mt+1] = 1. (4.2)
Since there are two exogenous innovations, ε1 and ε2, which are assumed to be indepen-
dent one can represent mt+1 as
mt+1 = m1t+1m2t+1, (4.3)
where for i ∈ {1, 2}
mit+1 =
Qˆi
(
εit+1|εt, X0
)
Qi (εit+1) . (4.4)
Here Qi denotes the probability distribution of εit+1. This implies that when the central
bank believe that two innovations are independent the private sector also considers them
independent even though the private sector’s expectations are not necessarily the same as
those of the central bank. For both i ∈ {1, 2} it is also satisfied that
Eit [mit+1] = 1, (4.5)
91
where Eit denotes a conditional expectation with respect to Qi.
The discrepancy between the distorted distribution of the private sector and the refer-
ence distribution of the central bank can be measured using conditional relative entropy.
For each source of shocks the conditional relative entropy of a one-step-ahead distribution
given date t information is given by Eit [mit+1 lnmit+1]. One then can define the expected
discounted entropy conditioned on date zero information as
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
Eit (mit+1 lnmit+1)
]
= E0
∞∑
j=0
βtmit+1 lnmit+1. (4.6)
Belief ambiguity with respect to shock i is described by a set of one-step-ahead densities
{mit}∞t=1 satisfying the constraint:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtmit+1 lnmit+1 ≤ ηi0 (4.7)
for some ηi0 > 0. As ηi0 becomes bigger, the degree of concern for belief ambiguity of the
central bank increases.
I assume that the objective of the central bank with concern for ambiguity about the
private sector’s expectations takes the form of
max
{pit,it,xt}
min
{m1t+1,m2t+1}
E−1
∞∑
t=0
−1
2
βt
[
pi2t + λx (xt − x∗)2 + λii2t
]
(4.8)
+ θ1E−1
∞∑
t=0
[m1t+1 lnm1t+1] + θ2E−1
∞∑
t=0
[m2t+1 lnm2t+1]
where θ1 > 0 and θ2 > 0 denote penalty parameters which measure the degree of concern
for robustness of the central bank for each source of shocks.4 By setting θ1 6= θ2, we assume
that the central bank has a different degree of ambiguity about how each exogenous shock
process might affect the beliefs of the private sector. For example, when θ1 < ∞ and
θ2 = ∞, the central bank worries about the lack of knowledge about the impact of a cost-
4θ1 and θ2 can be considered as Lagrange mulitipliers associated with (4.7) when the central bank solves
its optimization problem.
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push shock on the beliefs of the price setters while it fully trusts its knowledge about the
impact of a shock to the natural rate of interest on the private beliefs. Note that we still
assume that the central bank trusts its approximating model P of the exogenous shocks. If
θ1 = θ2, the model here reduces to Kwon and Miao (2013).
Note that in the objective function of the central bank with concern for robustness, I
used E−1 which is condition expectation at time −1 instead of E0. This implies the central
bank evaluates its policy using the conditional expectation with respect to the information
up to time −1, before the realization of shocks at time zero.
Using the one-step ahead likelihood ratio, NKPC and the IS relations, i.e., (4.2) and
(4.3), can be rewritten as
Et [m1t+1m2t+1pit+1] =
1
β
(pit − κxt − zt) , (4.9)
Et [m1t+1m2t+1xt+1] = − ξ
β
pit +
(
1 +
κξ
β
)
xt + ξit +
ξ
β
zt − ξrnt . (4.10)
Note that I simplified (4.3) by substituting Eˆtpit+1 using (4.2) in order to apply the frame-
work of Kwon and Miao (2013).
4.2.3 Timeless Perspective Commitment
To solve for robust policy, I focus on conditionally linear policy rules with commitment
under timeless perspective following Woodford (2010) and Kwon and Miao (2013). The
main reason why I restrict solutions to a conditionally linear class rules is that the optimal
commitment policy rule under rational expectations hypothesis is obtained as a condition-
ally linear form. By solving for a linear rule when the central bank suffers from concern
for ambiguity, one can see how a robust policy is different from an optimal policy under
rational expectations. In addition, by restricting my attention to a linear form, I can obtain
a closed form solution, which is normally not possible for a general class of policy rules.
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Suppose that the initial commitment takes a linear form:
[
pi0
x0
]
=
[
Φpi,−1
Φx,−1
]
+
[
Γpi1,−1 Γpi2,−1
Γx1,−1 Γx2,−1
] [
ε1,0
ε2,0
]
,
for some coefficients
(
Φpi,−1, Φx,−1, Γpi1,−1, Γpi2,−1, Γx1,−1, Γx2,−1
)
. For the sake of conve-
nience, let’s define
Φt =
[
Φpit
Φxt
]
, Γt =
[
Γpi1t Γ
pi
2t
Γx1t Γ
x
2t
]
and εt =
[
ε1t
ε2t
]
.
Also suppose that {pit} and {xt} chosen for periods t ≥ 1 may depend on (Φ−1,Γ−1) and
shocks from periods zero through t. We focus on conditionally linear rules of the following
form: [
pit+1
xt+1
]
= Φt + Γtεt+1 (4.1)
where Φt is stochastic and measurable with respect to date t information and Γt is de-
terministic. For any initial commitment (Φ−1,Γ−1) , the policymaker chooses (Φt,Γt)t≥0 ,
{pit, xt,mt}t≥1 , and {it}t≥0 to solve problem (4.8).
To define optimal policy from a timeless perspective, suppose that Φ−1 is drawn from
some distribution ρ. The initial commitment (Φ−1,Γ−1) is self-consistent if the solution to
the robust Ramsey policy is such that (i) Γt = Γ−1 and (ii) the unconditional distribution
of ρt for Φt is equal to ρ, for each t ≥ 0. Our goal is to solve for a conditionally linear
robustly optimal policy with a self-consistent initial commitment.5
To solve the model I conjecture that there exists Γt which can satisfy the self-consistency
of the initial commitment, i.e., Γt = Γ, ∀t and then verify it.6 For a detailed explanation,
please refer to Kwon and Miao (2013).
5See Woodford (2003, Chapter 7) for the concept of self-consistency under rational expectations.
6I cannot guarantee the uniqueness of the solution obatined in this paper.
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Form the Lagrangian
L = E−1
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
L (xt, yt, it) + θ1m1t+1 lnm1t+1 + θ2m2t+1 lnm2t+1
− φ1t (m1t+1 − 1)− φ2t (m2t+1 − 1)
− µpit
(
m1t+1m2t+1pit+1 − 1
β
(pit + κxt + zt)
)
− µxt
(
m1t+1m2t+1xt+1 +
ξ
β
pit −
(
1 +
κξ
β
)
xt − ξit − ξ
β
zt + ξr
n
t
)}
,
where φ1t, φ2t, µpit, and µxt are Lagrange multipliers corresponding to (4.5), (4.9), and
(4.10) respectively.
The first-order condition associated with m1t+1 is given by
θ1 (1 + lnm1t+1) = µpitEt [m2t+1pit+1] + µxtEtm2t+1xt+1 + φ1t. (4.2)
Substituting (4.1) into (4.2), one can derive
θ1 (1 + lnm1t+1) = µpitΦpit + µxtΦxt + φ1t + (µpitΓ
pi
1 + µxtΓ
x
1) ε1t+1.
Applying the fact that E1tm1t+1 = 1, one arrive at
m1t+1 = exp
[
− 1
2θ21
(µpitΓ
pi
1 + µxtΓ
x
1)
2 +
1
θ1
(µpitΓ
pi
1 + µxtΓ
x
1) ε1t+1
]
. (4.3)
Similarly for m2t+1, one can obtain
m2t+1 = exp
[
− 1
2θ22
(µpitΓ
pi
2 + µxtΓ
x
2)
2 +
1
θ2
(µpitΓ
pi
2 + µxtΓ
x
2) ε2t+1
]
. (4.4)
This implies that in the worst-case scenario, the central bank fears that the private sector’s
conditional expectation of εit+1 is distorted by
1
θi
(µpitΓ
pi
i + µxtΓ
x
i ) , i ∈ {1, 2}.
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Holding everything else constant, this distortion is increasing in the degree (or 1/θi) of
concerns for robustness of the model associated with the shock εi. Notice that if θi is
infinity mit+1 = 0 and the model collapses to rational expectations.
To see how different parameter values of θ1 and θ2 affect robust optimal policy responses
to exogenous shocks, we derive the equations that determine Γ :
[
θ−11 Eµ
2
pit + β θ
−1
1 Eµpitµxt
θ−11 Eµpitµxt θ
−1
1 Eµ
2
xt + βλx
] [
Γpi1
Γx1
]
=
[
1 −ξ
−κ β + κξ
] [
Eµpit+1ε1t+1
Eµxt+1ε1t+1
]
, (4.5)
and [
θ−22 Eµ
2
pit + β θ
−1
2 Eµpitµxt
θ−12 Eµpitµxt θ
−1
2 Eµ
2
xt + βλx
] [
Γpi2
Γx2
]
=
[
1 −ξ
−κ β + κξ
] [
Eµpit+1ε2t+1
Eµxt+1ε2t+1
]
. (4.6)
These two equations reveal that when θi →∞, the solution converges to that under rational
expectations. When θi < ∞, θi has a direct impact on Γxi and Γpii through the matrix on
the the left hand side of the equations. In addition, θi has an indirect impact on Γ
x
j and Γ
pi
j
through the moments Eµpit+1εjt+1 and Eµxt+1εjt+1. This implies that even if the central
bank has a complete knowledge about the private sector’s expectations about one source
of shock but suffers from concern for robustness relating to the other shock, the robust
optimal policy responses to both shocks can be affected. In other words, when 0 < θ1 <∞
and θ2 = ∞ not only (Γpi1 ,Γx1) but also (Γpi2 ,Γx2) can be different from Γ under rational
expectations.
4.3 Robust Optimal Monetary Policy
4.3.1 Main Results
In this section I characterize robust optimal monetary policy quantitatively. Then I will
illustrate the dynamics of the robust optimal policy rules and compare them with those
under rational expectations. In order to do that, I set the parameter values as follows:
β = 0.99, κ = 0.1, λx = 0.05, λi = 0.25, ξ = 1, ρz = 0, ρr = 0.35, σz = 0.01, and
σr = 0.025. These values are broadly consistent with those used in the optimal monetary
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policy literature. A brief description about parameters and their values can be found in
Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Calibrated values
Parameter Description Value
β discount factor 0.99
κ NKPC 0.1
λx weight on output gap in the loss function 0.05
λi weight on interest rate in the loss function 0.25
ξ intertemporal elasticity of substitution 1
x∗ target for output gap of the central bank 0.05
ρz AR(1) coefficient of zt 0
ρr AR(1) coefficient of r
n
t 0.35
σz volatility of zt 0.01
σr volatility of r
n
t 0.025
As the first step, I characterize the robust optimal policy for Γ. More specifically I
obtain Γ for different combinations of σz and σr as the degree of concern for robustness
changes. Figure 4·1 shows optimal Γxi and Γpii in response to changes in the volatility σz
of the cost-push shock with different degrees of concern for robustness about exogenous
shocks. We consider four cases: (i) θ1 = θ2 = ∞ (the rational expectations case); (ii)
θ1 = 0.0025, θ2 =∞. In this case, the central bank is ambiguous about the private agent’s
beliefs about the natural rate shock only; (iii) θ1 =∞, θ2 = 0.0025. In this case, the central
bank is ambiguous about the private agent’s beliefs about the cost-push shock only; (iv)
θ1 = θ2 = 0.0025. In this case, the central bank is equally ambiguous about the private
agent’s beliefs about both types of shocks.
The left two panels show that the responses of the output gap and the inflation rate
to the cost push shock (i.e., Γx1 and Γ
pi
1 ) are almost, if not exactly, the same for the case
of θ1 = θ2 = ∞ and the case of θ1 = ∞ and θ2 = 0.0025. At the same time, the results
for the case of θ1 = 0.0025, θ2 = ∞ and the case of θ1 = θ2 = 0.0025 also seem almost
the same. These facts imply that belief ambiguity relating to the cost-push shock has a
bigger impact on the determination of the commitment values for Γpi1 and Γ
x
1 while belief
ambiguity associated with the natural rate of interest has a minimal effect. This result
makes sense intuitively since when the central bank determines the robust optimal response
to the cost-push shock the ambiguity relating to the natural rate of interest should not have
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Figure 4·1: Variation of Γ with σz. Here σr = 0.025.
a large impact.
Also notice that Γpi1 increases and Γ
x
1 decreases in proportion with σz when the central
bank has a perfect knowledge about the private sector’s expectations, i.e. θ1 = θ2 =∞. This
linear relationship comes from the certainty equivalence of the linear-quadratic framework.
When the central bank suffers from concern for ambiguity, especially associated with the
cost-push shock, however, Γpi1 and Γ
x
1 do not vary with σz proportionally. This means that
when the central bank has concern for robustness, the property of the certainty equivalence
does not apply any more. Note that this finding is consistent with Woodford (2010) and
Kwon and Miao (2013).
Now let’s turn to the right two panels in Figure 4·1. I find that when the central bank
has a concern about ambiguity relating to the natural rate of interest, i.e. θ2 < ∞, there
is a level shift both in Γpi2 and in Γ
x
2 compared with the optimal responses under rational
expectations. When the central bank worries about belief ambiguity associated with the
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natural rate of interest, i.e. θ1 < ∞, Γpi2 and Γx2 change with σz in opposite directions: Γpi2
becomes less responsive and Γx2 becomes more responsive to an innovation of the natural
rate of interest, i.e. ε2. As discusses in the previous section, more precisely in the discussion
of equation (4.6) , this comes from the indirect impact of θ1 through changing moments.
One can find the indirect impact easily through the case θ1 = 0.0025, θ2 =∞. From (4.6),
it can be shown that
[
Γpi2
Γx2
]
=
[
β−1 0
0 (βλx)
−1
] [
1 −ξ
−κ β + κξ
] [
Eµpit+1ε2t+1
Eµxt+1ε2t+1
]
,
which implies that all changes in Γpi2 and Γ
x
2 are caused by the change in unconditional cross-
moments between Lagrange multipliers and ε2. Also note that Γ
x
2 and Γ
pi
2 does not change
with σz in the rational expectations case due to certainty equivalence. However, they are
not invariant with σz when the central bank is concerned about robustness, indicating that
certainty equivalence does not hold.
Figure 4·2 shows optimal Γ in response to changes in the volatility of the natural rate
of interest shock with different degrees of concern for robustness. From the left two panels,
one can observe that Γx1 and Γ
pi
1 do not deviate from the policy rule under the rational
expectations if the central bank worries only about belief ambiguity relating to the natural
rate of interest shock, i.e. θ1 = ∞ and θ2 = 0.001. Similarly in Figure 4·1, decreasing θ1
has a level shifting effect in Γx1 and Γ
pi
1 . I also find that, in the top panel of the left, θ1
plays a more important role in determining the shape of Γpi2 curves that θ2. These findings
mean that the central banks concerns more about belief ambiguity associated with the
cost-push shock even though the cost-push shock is assumed to have the smaller variance
than the natural rate of interest with the current calibration. This seems largely because
the cost-push shock makes the central bank face a serious trade-off between inflation and
output, which is not the case with the natural rate of interest shock. Thus in the worst case
scenario the central bank’s commitment policy for inflation is largely shaped by concern
for robustness relating to the cost-push shock. Finally from the bottom panel of the left it
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Figure 4·2: Variation of Γ with σr. Here σz = 0.01.
can be shown that smaller θ2 makes Γ
x
2 less responsive to the natural rate of interest shock
while lower θ1 has the opposite effect.
In Figure 4·3 I plot impulse responses of inflation, output gap, price level, and the
nominal interest rate to a positive cost-push shock. For comparison, I plot impulse responses
of four difference cases of belief ambiguity together. Here I see that general movements of
four variables are similar for all the different cases of belief ambiguity, even though they
are different in their level. More specifically, it takes longer time for inflation and output
to return back to their steady state level after a cost-push shock occurs. It is caused by
more history-dependency of monetary policy when the central bank has a concern for belief
ambiguity, which is consistent with Woodford (2010) and Kwon and Miao (2013). Since
the central bank has a concern for belief ambiguity, in its worst-case scenario the inflation
expectation of the private sector is higher than the central bank’s own expectation. Thus
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Figure 4·3: Impulse Repsonses to a positive cost-push shock with σz = 0.01
and σr = 0.025.
the central banks make policy rules such that they are more dependent on the history of
economic variables such as inflation and output gap rather than just depending on the
current state variables.
Also I find that dynamics of inflation, output gap, and price level under the rational
expectations are difficult to discern from those when the central bank has concern for belief
ambiguity only relating to the natural rate of interest, i.e. θ1 = 1, θ2 = ∞. And the
other two cases show similar movements of economic variables. This implies that belief
ambiguity associated with the cost-push shock plays a major role in determining the robust
optimal policy rules when the economy is hit by a cost-push shock. The bottom left panel
shows that the nominal interest rate increases more as the central bank suffers from concern
for robustness, reflecting the central bank’s fear that the private sector might have higher
inflation expectations in the worst-case scenario.
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In Figure 4·4, I plot impulse responses of inflation, output gap, price level, and the
nominal interest rate to the natural rate of interest shock. Similarly as in Figure 4·3 robust
optimal monetary policy becomes more history dependent as the central bank has concern
about belief ambiguity. What is different from Figure 4·3 is that now inflation and price
level shows four distinctive curves while their general dynamics are still similar. I also
see that concern for belief ambiguity only associated with the natural rate of interest does
not make a big deviation from the optimal policy under rational expectations. Another
difference I can notice is that the central bank allows output to be higher than under
rational expectations. When the central bank observes a positive shock to the natural rate
of interest, in the worst-case scenario the central bank fears that the private sector might
expect higher output and lower inflation than its own expectations. That is, the central
bank worries that the private sector expects a higher degree of economic variability. Since
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distorted beliefs in the worst-case in response to the natural rate of interest shock does not
imply a meaningful tradeoff, the central bank seems to accommodate the distorted belief.
In Figure 4·5, I plot impulse responses to a negative cost-push shock. Unlike impulse
responses under rational expectations in a linear-quadratic framework, impulse responses
with concern for belief ambiguity shows asymmetry, i.e. impulse responses to a negative
shock are not symmetrical to impulse responses to a positive shock. This asymmetry is
the most clearly shown from the impulse response of output gap. Comparing this with the
one in Figure 4·3, I see that output gap in the initial period after a negative shock is much
higher than under rational expectations, while after a positive shock output gaps with and
without concern for robustness are relatively similar. This property comes from the fact
that when the central bank suffers from concern for belief ambiguity, the steady state value
of output gap is distorted so that Φx,−1 is nonzero. The impulse response of inflation also
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shows asymmetry but it is not as noticeable as the case of output gap.
Figure 4·6 shows impulse responses to a negative shock to the natural rate of interest.
Compared with Figure 4·4, the asymmetry of impulse response of the interest rate is most
noticeable.
4.3.2 The Case of an Efficient Steady State
After having analyzed robust optimal monetary policy with the baseline calibration which
implies an inefficient steady state, i.e. x∗ = 0.05, now I turn to the case of an efficient
steady state, i.e. x∗ = 0. As Gal´ı (2008) points out, the efficiency of the steady state does
not affect optimal monetary policy with commitment so that impulse responses for the case
of an inefficient steady state is till valid for the case of an efficient steady state. Robust
optimal monetary policy rules, however, are dependent on the second moment of Lagrange
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Figure 4·7: Variation of Γpi1 and Γx1 with σz when x∗ = 0
multipliers, which also are likely to be affected by the presence of an inefficient steady state,
as shown in (4.5) and (4.6). Notice that when the central bank has a perfect knowledge a
change in the second moment of Lagrange multipliers does not affect optimal policy rules
for Γ.
In Figure 4·7, I plot Γpi1 and Γx1 with different levels of σz when the steady state is
efficient, i.e. x∗ = 0. Here I depict only Γpi1 and Γx1 mainly because I want to compare the
implication of the result in this paper with Woodford (2010) and Kwon and Miao (2013).
I see that Γ for θ1 = θ2 = ∞ does not change regardless of the value of x∗. When the
central bank has concern for belief ambiguity associated with the cost-push shock, however,
Γ is affected by the level of x∗. Comparing two cases of x=0 and x∗ = 0.05, I find that
Γpi1 with x
∗ = 0 is higher than Γpi1 with x∗ = 0.05 and even higher than under rational
expectations. This finding implies that robust optimal monetary policy commitment does
not necessarily mean less responsiveness to a new innovation to the cost-push shock. It
seems a more responsive policy commitment to a cost-push shock is better for otherwise the
central bank would face a considerable tradeoff between output and inflation: by allowing
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higher inflation than under rational expectations the central bank does not need to sacrifice
output too much. But when the steady state is inefficient the distorted beliefs of the private
sector is much higher than when the steady state is efficient so that the central bank tries
to stabilize inflation in order to better manage expectations of the private sector.
4.4 Conclusion
In this paper, I study a robustly optimal monetary policy problem under the assumption
that the policymaker might suffer from a lack of full knowledge on the private sector’s
beliefs. In order to investigate the relative impact of different sources of belief ambiguity, I
introduce the case in which the degree of ambiguity relating to cost-push shocks are different
from that associated with the natural rate of interest shocks, i.e. there are two entropy balls
with different sizes. In this context optimal monetary policy is studied using a model where
the objective function of the central bank involves the feature of interest rate smoothing.
Optimal monetary policy commitment under belief ambiguity differs in a substantial
way compared to under rational expectations. First, belief ambiguity relating to cost-push
shocks has a higher impact on the optimal monetary policy decision than that associated
with the natural rate of interest shocks. Since the natural rate of interest shock does not
involve a serious policy tradeoff to the central bank, belief ambiguity associated with it
does not change the monetary policy decisions as much as that relating to a cost-push
shock. Secondly, in some case robust optimal monetary policy allows initial inflation higher
than under rational expectations after a positive cost-push shock. When the steady state
is efficient, i.e. x∗ = 0, an initial response of inflation to a cost-push shock is greater
than under rational expectations. The central bank allows higher inflation in order not to
sacrifice too much output. Thirdly, robust optimal monetary policy is not symmetrical in
terms of its response to different signs of a shock.
This paper is based on a linear-quadratic framework and a linear class of solution.
Studying the impact of belief ambiguity in a micro-founded model as in Adam and Woodford
(2012) would be a promising extension of this work. Also it would be an interesting future
106
work to compare the welfare implication of robustly optimal policy with commitment and
with discretion.
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Appendix
4.A Robust Discretionary Policy
Up to now I have analyzed robust optimal monetary policy with commitment in a timeless
perspective. To see how it is different when the central bank does not conduct monetary
policy based on a pre-commitment, I turn to robust policy rules with discretion. With
discretion I mean that the central bank makes robust monetary policy decision based on
just the current state variables rather than considering the history of those variables. More
specifically, I follow Woodford (2010) and Kwon and Miao (2013) and find a linear Markov
Perfect equilibria (MPE). I use the algorithm described Kwon and Miao (2013) to solve for
a linear policy rule of the form:
[
pit
xt
]
= G
[
zt
rnt
]
, G ≡
[
Gpi1 G
pi
2
Gx1 G
x
2
]
. (4.A.1)
By substituting (4.4) and (4.5) into (4.A.1) for zt and r
n
t , one can find that G corresponds
to Γ. As in the commitment case, I study how different combinations of θ1 and θ2 will affect
G.
Figure 4·8 shows how MPE changes as σz and σr vary. The top panels depict optimal
responses to a cost-push shock under MPE. One can notice that inflation becomes more
sensitive to a cost-push shock as the degree of ambiguity increases, i.e. θ1 and θ2 decreases.
Also as in the previous example with a single shock, the range where MPE exists decreases
as a concern for robustness becomes greater.
Interestingly, optimal policy under discretion implies that the CB increases inflation in
response to a positive natural rate of interest shock while the CB actually reduces inflation
under commitment in a timeless perspective. One can see that as the CB faces higher level
of ambiguity inflation become more responsive to the natural rate of interest shock.
What draws our attention most, however, is that under MPE the CB tries to stabilize
output gap more when it has a fear for ambiguity as shown in the third row. It is strikingly
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Figure 4·8: Variation of G with σz and σr. Here G is the coefficient of the
shock processes (zt, r
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t ) in the robustly optimal discretionary policy rule for
inflation.
different from the commitment policy, where Γx1 is more responsive to a cost-push shock as
shown in Figure 4·1. This implies that the CB allows higher inflation to avoid a large degree
of negative output gap. Thus it could be possible to attain higher welfare under discretion
than under commitment in a timeless perspective for some degree of robustness. We leave
this issue for future research.
The bottom panels depict how MPE responds to the volatility of the natural rate of
interest shock, σr, with different values of θ1 and θ2.
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Chapter 5
Concluding Remarks
In this dissertation I addressed the question of how optimal macroeconomic policy should
be conducted when the policymaker suffers from concern for ambiguity, proposing useful
frameworks to characterize robust optimal policies. I applied these frameworks to optimal
monetary policy and study how it deviates from the results under the rational expectations
hypothesis by introducing ambiguity. In the first essay (Chapter 2), I studied three types of
a robust Ramsey problem corresponding to three types of ambiguity pointed by Hansen and
Sargent (2012) in a general linear-quadratic framework. In the second essay (Chapter 3), I
presented algorithms for solving robust policy problems in a general linear-quadratic frame-
work by extending the approach of Woodford (2010). In the third essay (Chapter 4), I
studied a robustly optimal monetary policy problem by extending algorithms suggested in
Chapter 3 so that the degree of concern for belief ambiguity is different for each exogenous
shock.
The framework to solve three types of a robust Ramsey problem, proposed in Chapter
2, is a comprehensive tool since it includes all three possible cases where the policymaker
is ambiguous about a model but the private sector is not. The analysis in this dissertation
clearly shows the importance of how to model what the policymaker is ambiguous about.
Chapter 2 shows different types of ambiguity generate very different policy responses to
an identical shock. The framework to solve Woodford’s approach, proposed in Chapter 3,
is closely linked to the type III ambiguity in Chapter 2 but exactly the same. Since the
framework in Chapter 2 assumes a Ramsey planner who decides optimal policy once-and-
for-all, robust optimal policy obtained by this framework is time-inconsistent. Woodford’s
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approach solves optimal policy in a timeless perspective, however, its policies are time
consistent. Also while I solved three types of a robust Ramsey problem in a second order
approximation, I restricted my interest to a linear class policy to solve Woodford’s approach.
One feature three essays in this dissertation hold in common is that all of them are based
on a linear-quadratic framework. I simply assumed that the baseline objective function of
the policymaker is in a quadratic form and equations describing the economy are given
as linear. Since the quadratic objective and linear constraints are obtained through an
approximation to a micro-founded model under the rational expectations hypothesis, it
is not surprising to find that the formulation of ambiguity is different from those in this
dissertation if one models the policymaker’s concern for ambiguity with micro-foundation.
Therefore, for future research it would be promising to study robust optimal policy with
a micro-founded model. Adam and Woodford (2012) solved an optimal monetary policy
problem under type III ambiguity with a micro-founded model using linear approximation
methods. It would be interesting to study different types of ambiguity in a micro-founded
model with non-linear solutions to capture the interaction between the volatility of shocks
and robust optimal policy. At the same time, by modeling with micro-foundation one can
address the welfare evaluation for robust optimal policy. It would be intriguing to analyze
which type is the most welfare deteriorating compared with under rational expectations.
Also for Woodford’s approach, it seems interesting to compare the welfare effect of robust
policy with commitment to that with discretion while changing parameter values.
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